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Thematic Input Paper 2:

Migration, development and climate change in North Africa

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1. Thematic perspective

1.1 Migration trends in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia

Migration in North Africa is a complex issue as different types of movements, caused by a variety of economic, political and social push- and pull-factors, can be observed. Migration trends in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia generally include emigration, immigration as well as transit movements of hundreds of thousands of people in just the last few years. Data availability is a concern for all of the migration movements in North Africa and it is therefore not possible to give a clear picture of the volume of these flows. Table 1 at the end of this section provides an overview of some key migration statistics; it is, however, important to understand that these numbers significantly under-represent the actual size of migration flows due to the irregular nature of many of the movements in the region.

- *Emigration:* Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia are traditional countries of emigration and significant shares of the populations do live abroad. Main drivers of migration from Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia are economic factors such as high levels of unemployment and poverty, political events including the Arab Spring as well as social and psychological factors such as family migration and migrant networks (diaspora).

The main destination countries of Moroccan and Tunisian emigrants are European countries, while traditionally Egyptian labour migrants move to other Arabic countries. However, recently political and economic developments (e.g. high levels of youth unemployment) as well as competition for jobs in Arabic countries led to an increase in (irregular) migration of Egyptians to Europe. Low-skilled North African emigrants are most commonly employed in low-skilled occupations such as plant and machine operators, assemblers or elementary occupations craft and related trades workers, service, shop and market sales workers. The conditions under which many of the migrants from North Africa live in destination countries are precarious and many are subject to human rights violations and integration problems.

Another important migration outflow is that of highly skilled individuals. In the case of Egypt, a large share of the migrants in OECD countries is tertiary educated (47% in 2014), while the trend is a bit different for Moroccan and Tunisian migrants with 16% and 20% respectively (World Bank, 2015). In 2000, the emigration rates of the tertiary educated were about 17% in Morocco, 13% in Tunisia and only 5% in Egypt (World Bank, 2011).

- *Immigration:* The securitization of migration, tighter European border controls and the increasing cost of migration to other countries overland have changed the nature of immigration movements in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. There are significant immigrant populations, which consist of labour migrants, irregular migrants, international students and migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa that are in transit to other countries as well as increasingly asylum-seekers and refugees. In particular the numbers of irregular migrants and asylum-seekers have been rising - groups that are among the most vulnerable in North Africa. In addition, victims of trafficking unaccompanied minor children, single mothers and their children as well as migrants rescued at sea often find themselves in particularly precarious situations.
- *De-facto destination countries:* Especially in recent years all three countries have become what can be called de-facto destination countries, with a higher concentration of migrants in urban areas. The geographical location between Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe, changes in migration

routes and the events in surrounding countries such as Libya and Syria have significantly changed the landscape of migration in North Africa. Transit migrants end up staying longer periods due to the increased migration restrictions and limited options for moving on to Europe.

- *Internal migration*: The urban population in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia has grown rapidly in the past and is predicted to continue doing so in the future. The urban population already made up 32% of the total population in 1950 in Egypt and Tunisia and 26% in Morocco. This increased significantly by 2015 (E: 43%; M: 60%; T: 67%) and is expected to further increase by 2050 (E: 57%; M: 74%; T: 77%) (UN DESA, 2014) which is in line with general urbanisation trends observed in low-middle income countries going through economic development.

Table 1: Migration Statistics for Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia

	Egypt	Morocco	Tunisia
Emigration			
Stock of emigrants in thousands (2013)	3,386.1	3,040.3	670.9
Stock of emigrants as percentage of total population (2013)	3.9	9.1	6.2
Main destination countries of emigrants (2013)	Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, United States, Qatar, Italy, Lebanon, Bahrain, Canada	France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Israel, Germany, United States, Canada, United Kingdom	France, Italy, Germany, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Canada, United States, United Kingdom, Belgium
Tertiary-educated as a percentage of total emigrants in OECD countries (2011)	46.7	15.7	19.9
Number of refugees (2014)	15,824	1,501	1,452
Immigration			
Stock of immigrants in thousands (2013)	416.3	50.8	36.5
Stock of immigrants as percentage of total population (2013)	0.5	0.2	0.3
Main origin countries of immigrants (2013)	Syrian Arab Republic, West Bank and Gaza, Somalia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Republic of Yemen, Libya, Jordan, Sudan, Indonesia	Algeria, France, South Sudan, Italy, Libya, Syrian Arab Republic, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Republic of Yemen, Jordan	Algeria, Morocco, France, Libya, Italy, Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Iraq, Ethiopia
Number of refugees (2014)	236,050	1,200	885
Main origin countries of refugees (2014)	Syrian Arab Republic, West Bank and Gaza, Sudan, Somalia, Iraq	Syrian Arab Republic, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, West Bank and Gaza	Syrian Arab Republic, Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, West Bank and Gaza

Source: UNHCR, 2016; World Bank, 2015b.

1.2 Risks, opportunities and strategies

Trends in migration illustrate that immigration and emigration will continue to be significant phenomena in all three countries. The diverse flows of migration are associated with particular risks and opportunities both on a national and regional level.

- *Diaspora engagement:* Emigration and maintaining links with citizens abroad are significant economic and political concerns. Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia all formed government ministries and organisations specifically designed to maintain links with their citizens abroad, in particular to encourage economic development through remittances and (temporary) return. The success of these measures depends on **active engagement with the Diaspora and different stakeholders** and stronger coordination between all institutions involved.
- *Protection of migrant rights and supporting integration:* One of the common major challenges is to **regularize** the situation of the ‘stranded’ irregular migrants and find long-term, sustainable measures to support their settlement in the respective Northern African country. To address these challenges a mind-shift is necessary: besides focusing on immediate emergency assistance for short-term needs, the protracted character of the current migration situation needs to be addressed. Giving a legal status (regularizing) to the long-term migrants and giving them access to services will enhance their potential to contribute to economic development. Moreover, a stronger emphasis on the protection of **vulnerable groups**, such as victims of trafficking and women, children and youth, is needed in addition to the legal basis regarding the detention and deportation of irregular migrants.
- *Migration policy development, coherence and implementation:* All three countries have taken some strategic and positive steps by signing a range of **international conventions** in relation to migrant rights and are in the process of developing a holistic approach to migration management. It is crucial that a **humanitarian approach** is taken on a constitutional level and actual practices **comply with the law**. Plus, a regionally coherent approach to migration management can have positive spill over effects for enhancing the economic development impact of migration.

2. Migration and development nexus perspective

2.1 Known links between migration and development

Migration is one of the trends shaping the social and economic development in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. While they are not among the countries with the largest number of migrants abroad, the importance of worker remittances in terms of their share of GDP is relatively high. Besides these financial resources, migration also has the potential to contribute to development through channels such as knowledge transfers and investments by return migrants and diaspora members. Table 2 shows the volume and relative importance of remittances as well as the size of the second-generation diaspora in Australia, Europe, and the USA as indicators of the potential for the links between migration and development.

Table 2: Migration and Development Indicators for Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia

	Egypt	Morocco	Tunisia
Inward remittance flows in US\$ billions (2014)	19.8	7.1	2.4
Remittances as a share of GDP (2014)	6.8	6.6	4.9
Second generation diaspora in Australia, Europe, and the USA in thousands (2012) in thousands	160.3	904.4	383.6

Source: World Bank, 2015a; World Bank, 2016.

The migration and development nexus is widely acknowledged. Namely, there is a strong link between migration and poverty alleviation in most developing countries, where migration is a way for households to move above the poverty line. However, this is conditional on various factors that can either enhance or mitigate the positive links between migration and development. For example, the socio-economic and political framework conditions in the countries of origin may limit the expected impacts on economic development of migration. Nonetheless there is evidence on linkages between migration and development, some of which will briefly be presented here:

- Financial remittances:* The inflow of officially recorded remittances in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia have steadily increased since the 1970s (see Figure 1 in the Annex). These monetary inflows have significant macro- and micro-economic impacts. In 2014, remittances made up 6.8% of GDP in Egypt, 6.6% in Morocco and 4.9% in Tunisia (World Bank, 2015a). The actual volume of remittances is likely to be significantly higher due to informal ways of remittance transfers that are commonly used by migrants from the three countries.

The potential of remittances to contribute to development does depend on who receives them and how they are used. In the case of Egypt, for example, almost 60% of remittances were received by female household heads, which were more likely to be out of the labour force and used the remittances mainly to satisfy basic needs. Other usages included education, health care and investments. However, it is important to note that the most vulnerable parts of the population are often not beneficiaries of migration and remittances as they lack the resources to migrate in the first place. A possible negative effect of remittance inflows is therefore an increase in income inequality.

- Return Migration:* Return migration does have the potential to significantly impact development of origin countries. The ability of return migrants to impact development depends on a number of factors such as the socio-economic and political framework in the country of origin, the nature of return (voluntary versus forced) as well as the reintegration process. Preparedness for return is an important factor in this relationship as a decided returnee is likely to have better experiences and reintegrate more sustainably, which in turn has implications for the contributions to development.

Skills and knowledge as well as savings acquired abroad can be transferred to the country of origin upon return. In how far this is possible largely depends on conditions such as the ability of the labour market to absorb the returnees either as wage-employees or through self-employment. The Egyptian labour market, for example, has been impacted by international migration through an increase in the number of employers and entrepreneurship. Migrants’ savings and experiences are found to have a positive impact on investments and the start-up of

entrepreneurial activities upon return. In addition, entrepreneurs in Egypt that have a migration experience have a higher chance of business survival compared to their non-migrant counterparts.

- *Diaspora Engagement*: Migrant communities abroad, the so-called diaspora, can also contribute to the development of their countries of origin through economic, social and political transfers. Diaspora engagement is highly dependent on the individual diaspora communities and their interests, aspirations, institutions and sources of identities. Such factors can influence if and how diaspora communities engage in development in the home country. Other contextual factors of the host country - including policies and legal regimes that help shape opportunity structures - likewise play a role in determining forms of diaspora engagement.

Permanent settlement of migrants in the destination countries is, however, also associated with a risk of losing ties with the country of origin. The Moroccan government, for example, has recognized this and aims to strengthen the loyalty of the diaspora to the country through the formation of a strong national identity. In this matter, the focus is also specifically on the second- and third- generation of Moroccan migrants. The policies focus on preserving a Moroccan identity through linguistic, religious and cultural dimensions. In addition, Morocco has the objective of restoring the trust of diaspora members towards the government and defending their interests by promoting their legal, social and humanitarian situation in the countries of residence.

Diaspora members can act remotely from the host country through projects by individuals or diaspora organizations (e.g. in the health or education sector, infrastructure or economic projects). Another channel of contribution by diaspora members is that of temporary return for the transfer of skills – social remittances - largely by highly skilled diaspora members. In this light several programmes, such as UNDP’s TOKTEN or IOM’s TRQN, have been established with the aim of harnessing the skills of the diaspora for knowledge transfers through short-term assignments in the country of origin.

2.2 National and regional level approaches to migration and development

Morocco is undergoing a process to change its entire migratory policy; the migration and development policy however has not materialised in a strategic document like the one focusing on immigration. Egypt and Tunisia also make efforts to deal with the new migratory context but due to the political climate, the changes are relatively slower.

A comprehensive national migration management strategy that is complemented by a regional approach is necessary to enhance the positive effects of migration on (economic) development.

- On the national level, a **holistic approach to migration** should link integration with labour market, education, health, social welfare and security policies.
 - In practice, **the initial steps** are 1) to provide legal status, 2) to introduce visas and short-stay work permits to all migrants and 3) to give access to employment, healthcare, education and justice services.
- Multiple institutions deal with migration in all three countries. On an operational and policy level, challenges relate to **overlapping responsibilities and ineffective coordination**.

- It is equally important that there are **interdepartmental discussions** and **open consultations with the civil society**. In Morocco the work of civil society organizations (e.g. the Human Rights National Council) has already proven to have positive impacts on migration governance, as they were a major influence in the development of royal instructions, which were an important step towards the implementation of a rights-based approach into the migratory policy of the country. Similar processes have not yet been observed in Egypt and Tunisia.
- Regional cooperation should allow for **exchanging experiences and information** on the best practices in the field to improve national policies and practices.

“The similarities in migration phenomena and the associated challenges in all three countries mean that a common approach (to migration) would be favourable to all.”(IOM, 2014)

- The countries need to move towards a **regional approach**. This requires closer cooperation, improved communication and power-balanced relationships 1) between Maghreb countries (e.g. reinstating of the Arab Maghreb Union, Arab Regional Consultative Process on Migration), 2) with Sub-Saharan countries (e.g. strengthen consular services) and 3) with European member states (e.g. EU Mobility Partnerships, EU-Horn of Africa Migration Routes Initiative and the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development).
- **International organizations** (e.g. IOM and UNCHR) can play a key role in dialogue processes. For example, IOM, the UNHCR, the Danish Refugee Council and the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat have formed the *North Africa Mixed Migration Task Force* (supported by the Mixed Migration Hub) dedicated to coordination and knowledge production regarding migration in the region.
- More systematic and broader agreements are needed to **create regular migration channels** (e.g. seasonal, temporary, or long term) to reduce the incentives for irregular migration and to combat trafficking and smuggling.
- A regional approach to **migration data collection and management** across the region should be a top priority.
 - Cross-country comparability of national data on migration flows and integration is essential for 1) understanding the migration trends and patterns, 2) assessing potential impact of migration on development, 3) predicting future migration trends and 4) identifying issues such as trafficking in persons, the exploitation of migrant labour and lack of access to basic services for migrants.
 - The joint analysis of data and exchange of information on these central issues can help harmonize development friendly migration and integration policies in the region, and stimulate collaboration when facing similar challenges.
- The links between migration and development can be enhanced by monitoring the labour migration systems and matching the expected needs of the **national labour markets**.
 - Following the example in Egypt, a web-based, **job-matching system** can be developed to link job seekers to (foreign) employers. Development of Skills Qualification Framework is also a significant step to take for regional cooperation.
 - A regional approach is relevant for the issue of **access to and portability of social security benefits** for inter-regional migrants. This would create common standards and remove discrimination among migrants that is created through bilateral policies.

The ILO Convention 157 on the maintenance of social security rights can set the basis for such an effort.

2.3 Links and synergies to explore in the future

What is the expected link between future migration trends and economic development?

- It is often assumed that increased development in countries of origin will automatically lead to a decrease of migration from these countries, particularly where it concerns economic migrants. What the evidence does in fact show, is that there is a so-called “mobility transition” (see Figure 2 in the Annex). This term is used to describe the relationship between the level of economic development of a country and its emigration rates. When graphed this takes the shape of an inverted-U relationship: initially, more development leads to more migration, dropping again after a certain time (Zelinsky, 1971). Therefore increased economic development is generally associated with higher levels of emigration, which can be explained by increased access to knowledge and (financial) resources as well as aspirations for migration. This suggests that even under the condition of stability and development, out-migration from the region may continue.

How to reconcile labour market pressure and brain circulation in the region?

- Egypt, Morocco and to a lesser extent Tunisia will continue to have an expanding workforce. National labour markets may face challenges of absorption and expansion of informal markets even in the case of increased employment creation through foreign direct investment (FDI) and offshoring or outsourcing.
- With the potential of transforming highly skilled migration to circulation of talent, migration will continue to represent a viable solution to take pressure off the national labour markets, especially for medium to high skilled job seekers.
- A major challenge is that all three countries have to compete against each other since the legal channels to migration in Europe have become stricter. In this regard temporary migration options can reconcile the interests of origin and destination countries.

How can investment in education address the needs of both national and international markets?

- All three countries face the challenge of addressing the inadequacies in the education field and need to reinforce their orientation toward international labour market requirements. Especially in a time where youth mobility (first time job seekers) is one of the rising migration trends, 1) cooperation with the private sector, foreign governments and foreign universities, and 2) giving greater autonomy to public education institutions can help with addressing pressures on education (e.g. shortage of vocational training institutions, lack of online lifelong training of human resources, and absence of R&D).

What is the future of rural-urban migration in the region?

- Even if the fertility rates are generally higher in rural areas, in all three countries the urban population is increasing at a faster rate than the national average. Inequalities in economic

development between rural and urban areas, differences in real incomes, fewer employment opportunities, disparities in social and health services and education as well as factors caused by climate change such as recurrent droughts, accelerating desertification and rising sea levels explain the increasing migration trends from rural to urban areas. Rapid urbanization also offers more job opportunities in cities and becomes an attractive destination particularly for youth.

- The linkages between internal and international migration are generally an area that is not well understood in the context of developing countries. Research often looks at the two as different processes, which is not reflective of reality. In most poor countries both can be observed, often involving the same households or even individuals. A study conducted in Egypt found that international migration is often seen as an alternative to internal migration and that Egyptians migrate internally and externally without a specific order or a common pattern. The various combinations of the two types of movement are used within the same households as a risk diversification and anti-poverty strategy.

What role for business climate for enhancing the links between migration and development?

- To improve the competitiveness of the region, boost employment opportunities, and alleviate brain drain, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia should attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as well as offshoring and outsourcing. The recent events in Egypt and Tunisia led to significant decreases in FDI in 2011 (E: -482 million US\$, T: 433 million US\$). Since then investments have picked up again (2014: E: 4.7 billion US\$, T: 1.0 billion US\$), but have not quite reached the level of before the crisis in 2010 (E: 6.4 billion US\$, T: 1.3 billion US\$) (World Bank, 2016). The liberalization of the economy, political stability and reinforcement of the rule of law can encourage foreign companies to invest in the region but equally stimulate remittances to be invested in productive projects and migrants to (temporarily) return to their home country for business.

3. The nexus between migration and climate change in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia

Climate induced migration is not the problem, and can be part of the solution (Foresight, 2011).

- *Migration as risk diversification:* In the context of climate change induced migration, most migration is typically undertaken by household members, instead of entire households.
- *There are no pure environmental migrants:* Climate change is not the sole driver of migration. Its role as a driver of migration can only be understood when considering its interrelationship with other demographic, economic, political and social drivers of migration. The direct effect of environmental change on migration should not be overestimated.
- In general, extreme weather events cause more temporary and short-distance internal migration. When migration is considered as an adaptive strategy to natural hazards, it leads to migration towards urban areas within the same country. This requires a stronger focus on localized mobility within countries.

- Only in border areas and small states, international migration will be more visible when climate change is a driver of migration. Moreover, depending on the impact of the event and other economic and political framework conditions, the rate of permanent migration may increase.
- Most research on climate change looks at shorter-term climate variability (e.g. floods, storms, drought), but this approach cannot necessarily inform our understanding of the effects of longer-term climate change effects on populations (e.g. increased salinization, rise in sea level).

Reduce the link of humanitarian crisis

- It is essential to note that climate change does not necessarily lead to more migration. “Trapped populations” with extremely limited resources may not have the means to benefit from migration as an adaptive strategy. In fact, millions of people might not be able to leave their locations even when they are exposed to environmental change.
- More and more, governments consider resettlement of individuals as a potential strategy against the effects of climate change. This strategy however receives considerable reaction given sociocultural and economic challenges and increased psychological stress associated with displacement. The main focus should be to build upon existing coping strategies and promote sustainable utilization of resources in rural areas to mitigate the negative effects of climate change. Alongside these efforts, voluntary migration can be an option for many households, but in any case displacement should be considered only as a last resort.
- Climate change is associated with decrease of available resources (e.g. water scarcity in North Africa) which in return may increase potential of conflict between different localities. The lack of resources combined with tensions related to political stability may make the region more vulnerable to conflict as a result of climate change induced migration.

Climate change and remittances

- While some researchers claim that remittances are mainly invested in start-up small businesses rather than agriculture, others highlight that in the case of Morocco the agricultural transformation of the country is supported by migration related investments in modern types of (oasis) agriculture.
- Migration and remittances tend to increase in response to climate shocks. In this regard, they function as coping mechanisms. However, there is not enough evidence to suggest that remittances are higher in areas that suffer from poor climate in the absence of weather shocks.

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
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Annex

Figure 1: Remittance Inflows in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, 1977-2014




Source: World Bank, 2015a.

Table 3: Ratification of Main International Conventions Concerning Migrant Rights

Convention	Year of Ratification		
	Egypt	Morocco	Tunisia
1951 Convention relating to Status of Refugees	1981	1956	1957
1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons	Not ratified	Not ratified	2000
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness			
1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination	1967	1970	1967
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	1982	1979	1969
1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights			
1969 African Union Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa	1980	N/A	1989
1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Woman	1981	1993	1985
1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	1986	1993	1988
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child	1990	1993	1992
1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families	1993	1993	Not ratified
2003 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime	2004	2011	2003

Source: ACHPR, 2016; UN Treaty Collection, 2016.

Figure 2: Relationship between International Migration and Development



Source: de Haas, 2009.