


GUIDANCE NOTE

# Peace, Conflict, and National Adaptation Plan (NAP) Processes



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## ABOUT THE NAP GLOBAL NETWORK

The NAP Global Network was created in 2014 to support developing countries in advancing their NAP processes, and help accelerate adaptation efforts around the world. To achieve this, the Network facilitates South-South peer learning and exchange, supports national-level action on NAP formulation and implementation, and generates, synthesizes, and shares knowledge. The Network's members include individual participants from more than 155 countries involved in developing and implementing National Adaptation Plans. Financial support for the Network has been provided by Austria, Canada, Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Secretariat is hosted by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). For more information, visit [www.napglobalnetwork.org](http://www.napglobalnetwork.org).

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# Peace, Conflict, and National Adaptation Plan (NAP) Processes

**December 2023**

# Acronyms

<b>CSM</b>	Climate Security Mechanism
<b>CSO</b>	civil society organization
<b>CVCA</b>	Climate Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization
<b>GCF</b>	Green Climate Fund
<b>GEF</b>	Global Environment Facility
<b>LDC</b>	Least Developed Country
<b>LEG</b>	LDC Expert Group
<b>MEL</b>	monitoring, evaluation, and learning
<b>NAP</b>	National Adaptation Plan
<b>NBI</b>	Nile Basin Initiative
<b>ND-GAIN</b>	Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative
<b>NGO</b>	non-governmental organization
<b>NMS</b>	national meteorological service
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNDPPA</b>	UN Department of Peacebuilding and Political Affairs
<b>UNEP</b>	United Nations Environment Programme
<b>UNFCCC</b>	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>VRA</b>	vulnerability and risk assessment
<b>WMO</b>	World Meteorological Organization

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# 1

## Introduction

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Climate change is one of the great challenges of our age. The impacts—increasing temperatures, harsher storms, more erratic rains, and rising seas, to name a few—are already affecting where people can raise their families, grow their food, and build their homes. The risks are considerable and growing, and the challenges of reducing individual, community, and national vulnerabilities and increasing resilience can seem overwhelming.

Nowhere is this more the case than in those communities and states affected by fragility, conflict, and instability. Geography already works against many of these countries: despite contributing relatively little to global greenhouse gas emissions, the populations in conflict-affected regions like the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle East often have very high exposures to climate risks (U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID], 2019).

For states experiencing conflict, climate change adaptation is rarely, if ever, an immediate priority: issues such as national defence, the prevention of further loss of life and suffering, and the establishment of peace take precedence. In countries recovering from conflict and violence, where peace—however fragile—has been established, governments are often faced with the difficult, lengthy, and complex task of strengthening and rebuilding the governance mechanisms and institutions required to meet the immediate needs of their population and to protect them from a host of risks, including the return of violence. As in situations of active conflict, prioritizing climate change action in peacebuilding contexts can be difficult.

However, the close links between climate change and fragility mean that it would be a mistake to ignore medium- and long-term adaptation needs in these peacebuilding contexts (Crawford & Church, 2020). In addition to compounding challenges to human development, climate change has long been recognized as a threat, exacerbating existing tensions and governance challenges to increase the risk, duration, or severity of conflict (United Nations, 2019). This threat is particularly acute in those countries and regions beset by weak governance and institutions (see Mbaye & Signé, 2022; Raleigh et al., 2015).

The drivers of both conflict and climate risks are often shared and include weak institutions, inequality, histories of violence, and poverty. In many conflict-affected regions or states, the twin crises of fragility and climate change can be mutually reinforcing. Conflict can undermine efforts to build the systems, institutions, and governance mechanisms needed to strengthen national and community resilience to climate change, while climate change can impact all phases of the conflict cycle (Crawford et al., 2015).

While climate change and conflict are often compounding challenges, adapting to the impacts of climate change can be an effective way of breaking this cycle by improving social well-being and addressing root drivers of fragility. Doing so in conflict-affected and peacebuilding contexts requires strategies for conflict-sensitive adaptation planning and programming that understands the local conflict dynamics associated with climate change and uses this understanding to tackle such dynamics, address climate vulnerabilities, and promote peace.

Strong adaptation actions are rooted in effective and inclusive planning, which in many countries is being led by the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) process. The NAP process was established in 2010 under the Cancun Adaptation Framework to help countries reduce their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and integrate adaptation into their medium- and long-term development plans and decision making. It is participatory, country-owned and -driven; includes sub-national and sectoral adaptation planning; and as an iterative, ongoing process, should be adjusted and adapted over time to reflect the changing climate, political, conflict, and development contexts, as well as any successes, challenges, and failures in adaptation action (Hammill et al., 2019; UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], 2021).<sup>1</sup>

This guidance note examines how governments operating in peacebuilding contexts can initiate, finance, implement, monitor, evaluate, and learn from their NAP process in a way that understands and responds to peace and conflict dynamics. The resulting conflict-sensitive NAPs are aligned with a country's peacebuilding and development objectives, actively promote peace, and work to minimize the risks that climate change and adaptation programming will contribute to conflict.

The guidance note's three primary objectives are:

- to outline the enabling factors required to design conflict-sensitive NAPs, namely leadership; data, knowledge, and communications; financing; institutional arrangements; stakeholder engagement; and skills and capacities;
- to offer practical entry points to design NAP processes whose main phases are aligned with peacebuilding objectives;
- to provide examples of how countries are integrating conflict and peacebuilding considerations into their NAP processes.

Section 2 of the guidance provides background, outlining challenges and opportunities associated with adaptation planning in conflict-affected countries and examining the case for alignment between adaptation planning and peacebuilding in these contexts. It also presents some of the ways in which governments have started to integrate conflict and peacebuilding considerations into their NAP processes. Section 3 focuses on the key enabling factors that governments will require, and that donors should support, to ensure effective alignment of NAPs and peacebuilding, namely: establishing support from leaders and champions for aligning adaptation

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<sup>1</sup> More information on the NAP process can be found in the [UNFCCC Technical Guidelines for the NAP Process](#), and through the [NAP Global Network website](#).

and peacebuilding agendas; increased financing for adaptation in peacebuilding contexts; capacity and skills development for adaptation and peacebuilding planners; further investments in the generation and dissemination of climate data and knowledge; strengthened institutional arrangements; and improved engagement with and among adaptation and peacebuilding practitioners. Section 4 examines entry points for making NAPs conflict sensitive across the three main phases of the process: planning; implementation; and monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL). Conclusions are presented in Section 5.

The guidance was developed by the NAP Global Network for developing country governments working on their NAP processes while struggling with or emerging from periods of national and sub-national conflict and fragility, though it also seeks to be relevant to other actors working in these contexts—particularly donor governments, regional support mechanisms, and development and humanitarian partners, given their important roles in supporting both peacebuilding and climate adaptation.

While it is possible to mainstream climate change adaptation in immediate humanitarian responses, this guidance, as with the NAP process itself, is focused on medium- to long-term planning and action. While some content will be relevant for integrating adaptation into humanitarian actions and disaster response, this area is not the focus of this paper. The guidance note was developed through extensive desk-based research, the creation of case studies, and discussions with NAP Global Network partner countries and focal points. The NAP Global Network’s technical assistance to conflict-affected partners has also informed the text.



# 2

## Background: Adaptation planning in conflict and peacebuilding contexts

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Conflict-affected states urgently need to adapt to the impacts of climate change. As with many developing countries, these states often have high levels of exposure and vulnerability to climate impacts, and low readiness within their governance systems and institutions to manage and recover from these impacts (Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative [ND-GAIN], 2020; USAID, 2019). There is, however, a particularly strong link between fragility, vulnerability, and low adaptive capacities; many of those states considered among the most fragile are also among the most vulnerable to climate change (see Table 1; the countries in shaded cells are among the top 12 most fragile states and most vulnerable to climate change). Within these contexts, months, years, or even decades of violence can significantly erode capacities to respond to climate change.

The feasibility of adaptation action—and adaptation planning as a first, crucial step—within these contexts is often further constrained by instability. If a country is in a state of active conflict, governments are primarily focused on waging war, mitigating violence, or making peace. Some governments in these contexts may not even be concerned with protecting their citizens from the impacts of a changing climate. Others may not have complete control of their territory, and so may not be able to effectively plan and implement adaptation measures.

If peace is established and the political will to tackle the climate crisis is present, the challenges and barriers to adaptation planning and action remain considerable, as governments struggle with competing, urgent needs. These include re-establishing security; rebuilding schools, hospitals, and critical infrastructure; creating jobs and supporting livelihoods; and restarting agricultural production and securing food value chains. Many of the systems meant to protect people from the impact of climate shocks and stresses—including early-warning systems, agricultural extension services, and water resource management practices—can be missing or neglected in the aftermath of conflict. Adaptation staff and budgets can be under-resourced and overwhelmed. The physical infrastructure necessary to support climate resilience efforts—including roads, wells, telecommunications, irrigation networks, and sea walls—may have been destroyed or fallen into disrepair. Land and resource tenure, access, and use rights, all crucial to addressing climate vulnerabilities and risks, may continue to be ill-defined or contentious. In addition, adaptation projects within the country may have been disrupted or cancelled altogether due to the violence, affecting the base of actions upon which plans can be built. International financing and investments for adaptation—already quite low in many Least Developed Countries (LDCs)—may have dried up due to perceptions of (very real) risk

(UN Development Programme [UNDP], 2021). At the national and local levels, the climate information and data needed to understand vulnerabilities and design effective and appropriate climate policies, plans, and actions may be insufficient.

**Table 1. The overlap between state fragility and climate vulnerability**

Rank	Fragile States Index ranking, 2023	Rank	Most vulnerable to climate change*
1	Somalia	1	Chad
2	Yemen	2	Central African Republic
3	South Sudan	3	Eritrea
4	Democratic Republic of the Congo	4	Democratic Republic of the Congo
5	Syria	5	Guinea Bissau
6	Afghanistan	6	Sudan
7	Sudan	7	Afghanistan
8	Central African Republic	8	Somalia
9	Chad	9	Liberia
10	Haiti	10	Mali
11	Ethiopia	11	Yemen
12	Myanmar	12	Congo

Source: [Fund for Peace, 2023](#); [ND-GAIN, 2021](#).

Notes: \*Most vulnerable to climate change (and other global challenges), and least ready to improve resilience (2021).

Countries in shaded cells are among the top 12 most fragile states *and* most vulnerable to climate change.

The combination of exposure to climate risks, the socio-economic realities of conflict-affected states, and high vulnerabilities and low coping capacities of populations and state institutions can, if left unaddressed, undermine peacebuilding and lead to climate change exacerbating conflict risks (Climate Security Mechanism [CSM], 2020). This could happen should drought, flooding, storms, and other climate impacts increase competition over a shrinking natural resource base; compromise food security; change migration patterns, including in and around cities; and undermine climate-dependent livelihoods such as farming, herding, and fishing (UNCSM, 2020). The threat is particularly acute in contexts where these impacts drive unemployment among

young men, making them susceptible to recruitment by organized crime and non-state armed groups (Mbaye & Signe, 2022; UNCSM, 2020). A failure of the state to protect its people against the impacts of a changing climate can undermine a population's trust in the government and erode the social contract that governments have with their citizens (Crawford & Church, 2020).

The NAP process offers governments and their partners an opportunity to rethink development in conflict-affected contexts, and to break vicious feedback loops between climate change and conflict. Thoughtfully designed and implemented climate adaptation programs and projects can help countries and communities cope with and recover from climate shocks and stresses. They can also address many of the root causes of conflict, strengthening the foundation upon which peace is built by supporting and enhancing livelihoods; reducing the pressure to migrate; strengthening food security; addressing gender and social inequalities; and promoting more sustainable natural resource use and healthier ecosystems.

It must be noted that climate change—while well-established as a potential threat multiplier and contributing factor in exacerbating grievances and underlying conflict vulnerabilities (UN Department of Peacebuilding and Political Affairs, 2022)—does not automatically lead to violence: many people adapt to climate change without resorting to violence, even in a context of increased suffering. And while adaptive capacities in conflict-affected countries are often compromised by violence, they can also be expanded, given the high level of adaptability required to live under such difficult circumstances. Supporting capacity for people to peacefully adapt to and thrive in a changing climate will be central to NAP processes in fragile states.

## 2.1 Adaptation, Peacebuilding, and Conflict Sensitivity

For this guidance, conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding are considered two stages of a continuum (see Figure 1 and see Appendix 2 for a glossary of terms used in this document). Both feature activities that aim to reduce conflict or promote peace in an area threatened by, experiencing, or recovering from intergroup conflict (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2007). The differences lie in how each stage interacts with peace and conflict dynamics. Conflict sensitivity is an approach to program and project delivery that seeks to minimize the possibility of activities (inadvertently) creating or exacerbating tensions and grievances, and can be applied to any form of programming, including humanitarian, peacebuilding, development, and climate change adaptation. It lays the foundation for sustaining peace. Peacebuilding includes a range of activities designed specifically to address the root causes of conflict and generate peace-related outcomes. All peacebuilding activities must be conflict sensitive but not all conflict-sensitive activities need to promote peace (UN Sustainable Development Group, 2022).

Figure 1. The spectrum of conflict-sensitive adaptation interventions



Sources: Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN [FAO], 2020; Interpeace, 2021; UNICEF, 2016a.

These terms can be considered on a spectrum. On one end is conflict- or peace-blindness, when programming does not consider the context in which it operates and has the potential to negatively affect the conflict or the communities it was designed to help (Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN [FAO], 2020). “Do No Harm” is an early framework for conflict sensitivity that seeks to reduce the negative effects of programming. All activities in conflict-affected and fragile states, including humanitarian and adaptation actions, should at minimum follow “Do No Harm” principles. Conflict sensitivity expands on “Do No Harm” by seeking to amplify the positive effects of programming, while peacebuilding goes a step further by setting

objectives to support peace. Along this conflict sensitivity–peacebuilding spectrum are different levels of peace and conflict work, including “sustaining peace” (FAO, 2020; UN Sustainable Development Group, 2022) and “peace responsiveness” (Interpeace, 2021).

Conflict sensitivity works “in” conflict, meaning actors recognize that programming does not exist as separate from the peace and conflict context in which it operates, so activities are designed to minimize their potential to exacerbate tensions and violence (Goodhand, 2006; Interpeace, 2010). Peacebuilding activities shift focus to work “on” conflict, meaning programming is designed specifically to address conflict drivers and support resolution, while still being aware of the conflict contexts in which it operates (European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, 2021; Goodhand, 2006).

Applied to climate change adaptation, conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding require a different approach to the existing UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) LDC Expert Group (LEG) technical guidelines for the NAP process. Conflict or peace considerations may influence adaptation planning in several ways; for example, in the choice of which sectors to prioritize—addressing first those sectors (such as water or agriculture) that may be linked to conflicts over resource use or competition—or in the approach to dynamics among stakeholder groups. Undertaking the NAP process with an awareness of conflict dynamics will help prevent the process from exacerbating tensions.

## 2.2 Aligning NAPs With Peacebuilding Agendas

Reasons why governments should actively align their NAP and peacebuilding processes include shared drivers of vulnerability, similar timelines for programming and impact, the need for strengthened governance, and the use of participatory, country-owned processes for success (Crawford & Church, 2020). This section looks at each of these opportunities for alignment.

### Shared Drivers of Risk and Vulnerability

A well-designed NAP process takes a holistic approach to identifying, prioritizing, and addressing climate risks and drivers of vulnerability. For fragile states, conflict is a key source of climate vulnerability (see Table 1), and conflict risks must be addressed through the NAP process to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of climate action. At the same time, several other underlying drivers of climate vulnerability can also drive conflict, including multidimensional poverty; social, gender, and economic inequalities; livelihood and food insecurity; and political marginalization. Adopting a gender-responsive and socially inclusive approach to the NAP helps ensure that differentiated vulnerabilities, perspectives, capacities, and needs—including those of people who are typically excluded from planning and decision making—are understood and integrated into both adaptation and peacebuilding plans and actions.

## Focus on Medium- and Long-Term Time Horizons

The NAP process is built around the integration of adaptation planning into medium- and long-term decision making and development plans and budgets, across sectors and levels of governance (UNFCCC, 2012). Given that it takes on average 22 years for a country to recover from a major conflict, a focus on mainstreaming adaptation into longer-term planning aligns well with peacebuilding timelines (Hoeffler, 2012). Early in this period, immediate needs must be addressed. These include reconciliation; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants; holding free and fair elections; and protecting civilians. However, work must also begin on longer-term processes of recovery, including rebuilding infrastructure, restoring public services, rehabilitating ecosystems, creating jobs, and repairing and strengthening the governance institutions needed to support the population and address the root causes of fragility (including climate change) to reduce the risk of sliding back into conflict.

The NAP process differs from past global adaptation action efforts, like the UNFCCC's National Adaptation Programmes of Action, that focused on responding to urgent and immediate needs to adapt to climate change. By extending horizons and mainstreaming adaptation into development planning, the NAP process is better aligned with supporting the medium- and longer-term peacebuilding priorities of a conflict-affected state (Crawford & Church, 2020). Early alignment of NAP and peacebuilding agendas ensures that governments and partners overseeing the transition from humanitarian action to peacebuilding to development integrate climate considerations throughout each of these often-uncoordinated pillars of work. Such longer-term thinking will help ensure that decisions made early in the post-conflict setting—such as reconstruction of infrastructure, design of water management systems, resettlement of displaced populations, or creation of jobs and livelihood programs—acknowledge and respond to existing and predicted climate impacts, thus increasing their effectiveness and sustainability. Finally, both the NAP and peacebuilding processes are iterative, and—based on well-designed, well-resourced, and well-capacitated MEL systems—should be adjusted and improved over time to ensure they continue to meet their objectives and adapt to a changing context.

## Centrality of Strengthened Governance

Both the NAP and peacebuilding processes are focused on strengthening the governance systems, institutions, and capacities that support resilience to climate or conflict risks, respectively. For conflict-affected states, failure of the state to adequately protect the population against further violence or the impacts of climate change can erode public confidence in the government at a time when trust is crucial. To help build the legitimacy of governments operating in a peacebuilding context, well-communicated, well-financed, and well-implemented plans to adapt to climate change can not only reduce a population's vulnerabilities to climate change, but also demonstrate that state and local authorities are actively working to reduce drivers of fragility. Central African Republic's peacebuilding plan, as one example, was adopted in 2016 after years of civil conflict and sees greater climate resilience as a critical means of renewing the social contract between the government and the population, alongside

strengthened governance, enhanced food security, and improved water services (Central African Republic, 2016). A central pillar of Madagascar's NAP, developed in a context of increasing local conflicts around natural resource use and population movements, has strengthened governance, particularly around decentralized management of natural resources (Ministère de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable, 2021).

Expanding beyond the national-level focus of the NAPs, transboundary collaboration and alignment on adaptation strategies and actions to address shared climate challenges can also help neighbouring countries more effectively tackle drivers of instability, including around shared resources such as water and cross-border migration. Cooperation on adaptation actions through the NAP process can even act as a tool for environmental peacebuilding, particularly in those cases in which conflict—either within or across borders—has affected international relationships. Working together on a challenge that transcends political boundaries can offer an entry point for initiating dialogue and building trust.

## Emphasis on Participatory and Country-Owned and -Driven Processes

Successful NAP and peacebuilding processes share many of the same core principles and characteristics. Both should be designed, implemented, monitored, and evaluated in a participatory and transparent way, bringing in the perspectives of a diverse set of interested actors. This includes not just those from government, but also community members, civil society organizations (CSOs), and private sector actors. Meaningful inclusion in peacebuilding and adaptation decision making will help both address and prevent grievances.

As a peacebuilding co-benefit, participatory adaptation planning can also build trust and relationships among interested actors who may not have previously had any common ground, but who can be brought together around a mutual desire to address a shared challenge and threat. In Timor-Leste's NAP, priority adaptation actions were identified and designed in a participatory way that brought together all affected actors, to strengthen continued government efforts to build social cohesion following the bloodshed of the independence struggle (Secretariat of State for Environment, Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, 2021). Finally, both processes must be owned and driven by the countries themselves—neither plan can be imposed from outside but must be designed and carried out by those within the country who have a strong interest in achieving peace and resilience.

# 3

## Enabling Factors

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Six connected enabling factors facilitate a successful NAP process (Figure 2). Establishing and strengthening these factors will help teams integrate peace and conflict considerations into the NAP and align the NAP with the country’s peacebuilding efforts. Specifically, NAP teams, working with colleagues from across government and with external partners, will have to support stronger leadership; data, knowledge, and communications; financing; institutional arrangements and policy frameworks; stakeholder engagement; and skills and capacity development. The absence of these enabling factors will serve as a barrier to all three phases of the NAP process: planning, implementation, and MEL. And while these enabling factors apply to adaptation planning in all countries, the specific operating context of conflict-affected states means that these factors can play crucially important roles in not only supporting the NAP process but ensuring that the process reduces conflict risks and supports peace.


The following section examines each of these enabling factors, underscoring their importance to both NAPs and peacebuilding, and noting the desired outcome countries should be working toward as they strengthen and support each factor.



Photo: “Operation Free Shabelle” liberates Afgoye from Al Shabaab (UN Photo/Stuart Price)



Figure 2. Phases and enabling factors of effective NAP processes



Source: [NAP Global Network](#), 2023.

## 3.1 Leadership

### Why Leadership is Important to the NAP Process

High-level leadership is crucially important to the NAP process. At the most fundamental level, political leaders provide a mandate for the process. This requires an institutional commitment, with leaders setting up the policies, organizational structures, and accountability mechanisms

required to push adaptation planning and action forward among government ministries and sub-national authorities. Leaders must also communicate their government's commitment to adaptation to a broad audience, using their platform to highlight the importance of the NAP process and its vision, guiding principles, objectives, and cross-cutting nature, and explaining how the NAP aligns with national development plans. In doing so, they can galvanize broader participation in the process. They can also use their convening power to bring diverse participants into all phases of the NAP process, elevate the roles of groups or communities that face discrimination in climate decision making and action, and inspire or even mandate alignment and cooperation among key actors—especially with those at sub-national levels, who often operate on different timelines. Critically, leaders can allocate domestic finances to adaptation and help mobilize international assistance in support of NAP design, implementation, and MEL. Finally, high-level political leadership of the NAP process underscores support for international commitments, including those under the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement, and the Sendai Framework.

The importance of leaders to the NAP process extends to those outside national governments—champions from civil society, the private sector, local governments and so on—who can similarly galvanize public support for adaptation action.

## What's Different About Conflict-Affected Contexts

The importance of leadership to the NAP process equally applies in conflict-affected states. However, within these contexts, there can be significant barriers to effective leadership on climate adaptation. For states experiencing or recovering from violence, the attention of political leaders and the public is often not focused on the climate crisis. Leaders in conflict-affected contexts must guide their societies away from violence while re-establishing the rule of law, public services, and functioning institutions—assuming that this recovery is in their interests (Hasegawa, 2015).

Leaders within these contexts may also not have complete control of their territory, or they may be transitional leaders without a full mandate from the electorate. Their convening power may be limited, should mistrust and broken relationships among parties to the conflict exist or persist beyond its resolution, preventing the NAP from being truly participatory. The ability of these leaders to communicate the NAP and its objectives to the public may be constrained by damaged or insufficient infrastructure, while the mechanisms and capacities required to coordinate national actions with sub-national authorities and stakeholders may be constrained or non-existent. If public trust in high-level political leaders is absent or frayed in a conflict or post-conflict setting, other NAP champions may need to step in to spur and coordinate both peacebuilding and adaptation actions from the bottom up.

## What You Can Do About It

Within fragile contexts, it is important and advantageous for political leaders and NAP champions to visibly commit to alignment between the adaptation and peacebuilding agendas

and actions. This can be achieved through public commitment and effective communication, and through focusing on dialogue and cooperation.

### **OBTAIN PUBLIC COMMITMENT**

Leaders committed to peace can achieve peacebuilding co-benefits by championing a NAP process. A public commitment to the NAP process signals a leader's commitment to advancing national interests (including long-term resilience) and stability (by addressing some of the shared drivers of climate and conflict risk)—two critical areas of concern for leaders in post-conflict contexts (Hasegawa, 2015). It reflects a constructive focus on the future and the direction the country is moving within a changing climate. And the NAP process can also help leaders identify the opportunities—for example, for financing, jobs, or dialogue—that can further bolster peacebuilding efforts and public support.

Leadership and action on climate adaptation, including planning and implementation, can help increase public confidence and trust in the government, particularly if these plans and actions are well communicated and executed. Transparency is important here: leaders should be open about the long-term NAP vision and its adaptation and peacebuilding benefits, who needs to do what and when to achieve this vision, and any adaptation and peacebuilding successes that have been achieved, as well as failures experienced along the way (Mukendi, 2010). Managing expectations is critical: leaders will need to communicate the plan and what can feasibly be achieved under it to the public, including the challenges and assumptions that could hamper its implementation, such as insufficient financing. This can be at least partially achieved through the participatory nature of the NAP itself, which will help leaders ensure that broad stakeholder concerns are reflected in the plan and that limitations are well understood by those involved in its development.

### **FOCUS ON DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION**

The NAP process provides leaders—from within government, but also from CSOs, the private sector, faith-based organizations, the media, communities, and a country's development partners—with an opportunity to bring together political opponents previously engaged in conflict, with climate change representing a shared challenge and adaptation potentially providing a less contentious basis for dialogue and cooperation. Where public trust in high-level political leaders is weak, efforts should be made to amplify the voices and roles of leaders from outside of national government who can push adaptation planning and action forward.

Aligning the NAP with the peacebuilding agenda and those leading it, if applicable, will increase the political visibility and momentum of the NAP process. Alignment will not be driven by a single ministry such as the one responsible for environment, but rather by a partnership between those driving the NAP process and a ministry—typically a high-profile one—with a broader coordination mandate, or the office behind the peacebuilding process (such as Economic Planning or the Office of the President or Prime Minister).

The NAP process can also provide national leaders with the opportunity to strengthen their links with sub-national authorities—links that are crucial to both adaptation and peacebuilding.

Working through these local authorities to focus climate action on the needs of traditionally marginalized and vulnerable communities will also present leaders with an opportunity for reconciliation and redressing past neglect and grievance. As with peacebuilding, a successful NAP process is not solely top-down, but also requires a strong foundation built from the bottom up.

### Good Practice Example 1: Somalia

In May 2022, amid one of the worst droughts in Somalia's history, the newly elected government prioritized the creation of a new Federal Ministry of Environment and Climate Change. Since its inception, the Ministry has made it clear that Somalia is pursuing a joint climate change adaptation and peacebuilding agenda.

Early in her tenure, Somalia's first-ever Minister of Environment and Climate Change, Khadija Mohamed al-Makhzoumi, framed the climate change and security challenges in Somalia as interlinked and in need of joint solutions. At the Berlin Climate and Security Conference in October, she stressed that "climate security and environmental peacemaking are critical for Somalia" (Al-Makhzoumi, 2022a) while supporting the launch of the Climate for Peace initiative, of which Somalia is a member. The minister echoed and expanded these comments at several talks about conflict, peace, and security at COP 27 in Egypt, including at the launch of the Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace Initiative. In the Security and Climate Change Forum, she emphasized that "security and climate change are inextricably linked in Somalia. The protracted wars destroyed infrastructure, which made it difficult to overcome the challenges of climate change" (Al-Makhzoumi, 2022b). Somalia has also integrated conflict and peacebuilding considerations into its early NAP outputs, including its Adaptation Communications and NAP Framework.

## 3.2 Data, Knowledge, and Communications

### Why Data, Knowledge, and Communications are Important to the NAP Process

The NAP process is meant to be participatory and inclusive, and guided by the best available climate science and, as appropriate, traditional and Indigenous knowledge (UNFCCC, 2012). These two guiding principles for the NAP are built on the understanding that strong adaptation policies, plans, and actions are built on, among other factors, good data and knowledge. There is a need in all countries for a complete, up-to-date, and well-communicated understanding of current and future climate impacts, vulnerabilities, and risks so that governments, communities, and other interested actors understand how their climate is changing; how these changes will or could affect health and well-being, equality, livelihoods, and economies; and what available or innovative adaptation options might best address these changes and meet individual, community, and national priorities for climate resilience.

The ongoing generation of climate data and knowledge is crucial. However, equally important is the sharing of this information and information about the NAP process and adaptation efforts within and across government departments and stakeholder groups in a transparent, accessible format that can be tailored to the needs of the target audience (Ledwell, 2018). This includes ensuring that access to information on adaptation and on all phases of the NAP process is equitable for people of all genders and social groups (Dazé & Church, 2019). With this information in hand, decision-makers will be able to develop a NAP that is grounded in science and reflects the perspectives of a broad range of stakeholders.

## What's Different About Conflict-Affected Contexts

Generating data and knowledge on climate change impacts, vulnerabilities, and risks, and communicating both these and the NAP process to stakeholders, remains a key challenge for conflict-affected countries. Policy-makers and practitioners working on adaptation in peacebuilding contexts typically face a dearth of climate data and knowledge following a conflict, including on the past, current, and predicted climate. This deficit can make it difficult to accurately assess and communicate climate vulnerabilities—including how they influence conflict risks—and design adaptation interventions that support climate resilience and peacebuilding. Accurate climate information and predictions can be of critical importance to adaptation planners and peacebuilders in conflict-affected contexts, given the risks that extreme weather events—whether fast or slow in onset—can pose to the populations they support; a particularly severe storm can wipe out humanitarian and peacebuilding gains in a context that is ill-prepared. These populations are particularly vulnerable to disasters; a 2016 study found that 58% of disaster deaths happen in the 30 most fragile states (Peters & Budimir, 2016).

### **Box 1. Case Study: Weather stations and conflict-affected countries**

The impact of conflict on the generation of climate data is well documented. Sierra Leone's NAP notes that many of the country's weather stations were vandalized during its civil war, creating significant gaps in the precipitation record (Government of Sierra Leone, 2021). Upon seizing control of Afghanistan in 1996, the Taliban promptly fired the country's 600 meteorologists, closed the Afghan Meteorological Authority, and burned the country's climate data archive (Dokoupil, 2015). Afghanistan now has just four land-surface climate stations reporting to a global network of such weather stations, translating to roughly one station per 163,215 km<sup>2</sup> (km<sup>2</sup>; National Centers for Environmental Information, 2022; see Table 2). This compares to 922 such stations in Finland, the world's most stable state, where there is one station for every 367 km<sup>2</sup>. As illustrated in Table 3, the scarcity of reporting weather stations is not limited to Afghanistan.

Several factors generate climate data and knowledge deficits in conflict-affected states (Mason et al., 2015). Data and knowledge may have been limited or non-existent prior to the conflict. The country's national meteorological service (NMS) and statistics bureau, which are mandated

to generate, analyze, and disseminate data on weather and climate and key measures of socio-economic well-being, respectively, are often depleted by conflict. The staff and infrastructure needed to generate and process the information may have fled or been killed during the conflict. Domestic budgets for generating climate data have likely been reduced, training programs halted, and international technical and financial support suspended. Finally, the infrastructure needed to generate the data—including rain gauges and weather stations—may have been destroyed, damaged, or neglected during the violence (Mason et al., 2015). A similar fate may have befallen a country’s telecommunications infrastructure, limiting the channels through which the government can communicate data about climate change and the NAP process. Staff and institutional capacities in strategic communications—that is, the ability of the government to develop key NAP and climate change messages tailored to priority audiences and delivered through the most appropriate communications channels (Ledwell, 2018)—may also be limited. The same may be true of capacities to use climate data to assess the conflict implications of climate change and integrate this knowledge into peacebuilding plans.

**Table 2. Land surface climate stations in selected countries**

Country	Fragile States Index ranking <sup>a</sup>	Number of land surface climate stations, 2021 <sup>b</sup>	Total land area (km <sup>2</sup> ) <sup>c</sup>	Total population (millions, 2020) <sup>c</sup>	People per station	Land area covered per station (km <sup>2</sup> )
Democratic Republic of the Congo	4	13	2,344,860	89.6	6,892,307	180,373
Syria	5	12	185,180	17.5	1,458,333	15,431
Afghanistan	6	4	652,860	38.9	9,725,000	163,215
Sudan	7	28	1,854,105	43.8	1,564,285	66,218
Central African Republic	8	17	622,980	4.8	282,352	88,997
Chad	9	14	1,284,000	16.4	1,171,428	91,714
Zimbabwe	16	20	390,760	14.9	745,000	19,538
Finland	177	922	338,450	5.5	5,965	367
Norway	179	461	625,222	5.4	11,713	1,356

Sources: <sup>a</sup> The Fund for Peace (2023); <sup>b</sup> National Centers for Environmental Information (2022); <sup>c</sup> World Bank (2022).

## What You Can Do About It

If you are working in a conflict-affected state, you and your partners can work to ensure that climate data and knowledge are accessible to all stakeholders by identifying gaps and building capacity to communicate both climate data and information about the NAP process itself.

### IDENTIFYING AND ADDRESSING THE DATA GAP

Resources are available to conflict-affected governments and their partners to help fill the climate adaptation data gap as the state rebuilds its ability to generate, interpret, and communicate data and knowledge on key climate metrics (such as rainfall and temperature) and on socio-economic vulnerabilities (Mason et al., 2015). Donors and other international partners should continue to make what data they have available to conflict-affected governments and in-country stakeholders to ensure that, even in the absence of strong nationally generated data and knowledge, initial work can begin on adaptation planning based on data that is “good enough” while national systems are being (re)built.

On climate metrics, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) has Regional Climate Centres that produce high-resolution climate data sets, monitoring products, and long-range forecasts for the NMS of the organization’s members. This support is complemented at the global level by the Global Producing Centres for Long-Range Forecasts, an international network of scientific centres that produce seasonal forecasts at the planetary scale; both the Regional Climate Centres and Global Producing Centres for Long-Range Forecasts can help fragile state governments and partners fill climate data gaps with high-quality information as they rebuild their own networks. In addition, Regional Climate Outlook Forums made up of national, regional, and international experts regularly convene to produce regional climate outlook products focused on the upcoming season. [Climateinformation.org](https://climateinformation.org)—an initiative of the WMO, Green Climate Fund (GCF), and World Climate Research Programme—consolidates openly available global climate information to produce summary climate reports for any site in the world. In addition to these initiatives from the WMO and its partners, several freely available databases of satellite-based climate information can be accessed to better track key metrics like temperature, vegetation cover, and rainfall (see Table 3).

Further resources for climate and socio-economic data may be available on the ground through academia, the private sector, and CSOs; farmers’ associations and conservation organizations, for example, may have historical and current records on local precipitation and temperature that could be of use for adaptation and peacebuilding planners (Mason et al., 2015). Such partners may support in the generation and provision of climate or vulnerability data in those areas where the government’s presence is limited but where such organizations are active.

An increasing number of resources are available to governments seeking to address their data gaps, in recognition that these gaps reduce the effectiveness of humanitarian, development, and peace operations (Complex Risk Analytics Fund, 2021). The World Bank’s new Global Data Facility is a fund designed to support data generation and dissemination at the community,

national, regional, and global level (World Bank, 2021). The facility is complemented by the Complex Risk Analytics Fund, a multilateral funding instrument designed to boost critical data investments in fragile settings to spur anticipatory, rather than reactive, action to complex threats, including climate change (Complex Risk Analytics Fund, 2021).

### **BUILDING CAPACITIES TO USE AND SHARE CLIMATE DATA AND KNOWLEDGE**

Being able to generate and access climate data and knowledge is not enough; you and your partners must also have the skills to interpret, use and communicate this information so that you and other stakeholders understand what you are adapting to, what adaptation options are appropriate and available, and how these interventions can support peacebuilding aims. This communication will allow stakeholders to participate more actively in decision making.

This shift requires significant investments in building capacities on climate change and strategic communications for staff within the NMS and the departments and ministries tasked with leading both the NAP and peacebuilding processes. Partners from academia, international organizations, and the donor community can support this capacity building, both technically and financially. Capacity building will help ensure that climate-related information and data is well understood and delivered to relevant stakeholders in a format that is accessible, equitable, and understandable to policy and practitioner audiences, and at a timescale that is appropriate to peacebuilding needs. For example, weekly and seasonal forecasts are required for early-warning systems, so that communities and humanitarian organizations can prepare for and respond to extreme weather events, while information on climate variability will be more relevant to medium-term planning, and longer-term predictions are applicable to extended national development, peacebuilding, and resilience investments (Mason et al., 2015).

As NMS are rebuilt and conflict-affected governments regain the ability to generate local and national-level climate data and knowledge, they should also consider how this information will be disseminated. The dissemination plan will depend on the country's access to information laws, connectivity, and costs, but ideally this information will be distributed in real time through automated systems and in a usable format to facilitate the identification of short- and long-term climate threats (Mason et al., 2015). Care must also be taken to ensure that access to this information is equitable and inclusive, and to identify and address barriers to information access (Dazé & Church, 2019).

### **COMMUNICATING THE NAP PROCESS AND ITS LINKS TO THE PEACEBUILDING PROCESS**

Strengthening capacity for strategic communications will also support your efforts to share information about the NAP process and its connections to peacebuilding. This includes effectively communicating NAP aims, objectives, timelines, and approaches to specific audiences via key messages, tailored language, and the most effective and accessible channels (Ledwell, 2018). For conflict-affected states, it extends to understanding and communicating the links—whether existing or potential—between climate change and conflict, and the role that climate adaptation



can play in supporting the peace process. Again, it is important here to identify and address gender-specific barriers to information access (Dazé & Church, 2019).

**Table 3. Select sources of satellite-based climate information**

Climate factor	Source	Link
<b>Rainfall</b>	Global Precipitation Climatology Project	<a href="https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/products/global-precipitation-climatology-project">https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/products/global-precipitation-climatology-project</a>
	Climate Prediction Center Merged Analysis of Precipitation	<a href="https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/global_precip/html/wpage.cmap.html">https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/global_precip/html/wpage.cmap.html</a>
	Climate Prediction Center MORPHing technique	<a href="https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/products/climate-data-records/precipitation-cmorph">https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/products/climate-data-records/precipitation-cmorph</a>
	Global Precipitation Measurement and the Integrated Multi-satellitE Retrievals for Global Precipitation Measurement	<a href="https://gpm.nasa.gov/data/imerg">https://gpm.nasa.gov/data/imerg</a>
	Enhancing National Climate Services	<a href="https://iri.columbia.edu/resources/enacts/#:~:text=The%20Enhancing%20National%20Climate%20Services,and%20Use%20of%20climate%20information">https://iri.columbia.edu/resources/enacts/#:~:text=The%20Enhancing%20National%20Climate%20Services,and%20Use%20of%20climate%20information</a>
<b>Temperature</b>	Land-Surface Temperature	<a href="https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/global-maps/MOD_LSTD_M">https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/global-maps/MOD_LSTD_M</a>
<b>Vegetation cover</b>	Global Normalized Difference Vegetation Index	<a href="https://www.ospo.noaa.gov/Products/land/gvi/NDVI.html">https://www.ospo.noaa.gov/Products/land/gvi/NDVI.html</a>
	TERRA-MODIS Normalized Difference Vegetation Index	<a href="https://modis.gsfc.nasa.gov/data/dataproduct/mod13.php">https://modis.gsfc.nasa.gov/data/dataproduct/mod13.php</a>

Source: Mason et al., 2015.

## 3.3 Financing

### Why Financing is Important to the NAP Process

By identifying a country's adaptation priorities and needs, the NAP process provides a basis for estimating and communicating the funding needed to meet that country's adaptation objectives. Developing country governments will not be able to meet these funding needs alone; a significant portion of the required funds will have to come from international funders, including bilateral and multilateral sources; a smaller amount—at least initially—can come from the private sector. The types of financing (short-term, long-term) available should also match the timeframe of expected climate impacts (Parry et al., 2017). Moreover, access to financing must be equitable, identifying and addressing the barriers faced by women and marginalized groups and integrating gender into funding proposals (Dazé & Church, 2019).

As noted above, the move from adaptation planning to implementation will require a significant increase in international financing from a variety of sources: bilateral providers, multilateral climate funds within and outside of the UNFCCC (such as the GCF, Adaptation Fund, and the Global Environment Facility's LDC Fund), non-climate-focused multilateral funds, and multilateral development banks (Parry et al., 2017). Bilateral support for NAP implementation will typically come either through a donor's targeted climate fund or via government-to-government negotiations and tends to be more flexible than funding secured through multilateral sources; a potentially attractive attribute given the dynamic nature of many conflict-affected states (Parry et al., 2017).

### What's Different About Conflict-Affected Contexts

For many conflict-affected states, securing climate financing to support the NAP process is a challenge. To date, public and private climate financing in conflict-affected states has been insufficient. Domestically, national budgets typically have limited funding available to allocate toward adaptation planning and implementation, while private investments remain minimal as the economy is rebuilt and businesses, from small to large, work to refocus their operations following violence. Within these contexts, capital markets may not be functioning in a way that allows for stakeholders to invest in increasing their resilience to climate change, or in developing new goods and services that support adaptation.

Donors and investors also continue to be cautious of investing in conflict-affected countries due to the considerable risks involved in financing adaptation projects in these states. A 2021 review by UNDP and the CSM, which analyzed USD 14 billion<sup>2</sup> in international climate financing delivered from 2014 to 2021, highlighted how climate financing is not getting to the most vulnerable. The amount of financing for climate mitigation and adaptation sent to countries considered fragile averaged USD 10.8 per person, which stands in stark contrast to the USD

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<sup>2</sup> All monetary amounts are in U.S. dollars.

161.7 per person going to non-fragile states, including small island developing states (UNDP, 2021). The divide is even greater, however, for those states considered “extremely” fragile, which received on average just USD 2.1 per person in climate financing (UNDP, 2021). Only one of the top 15 funding recipients in the combined group of fragile and extremely fragile states was considered “extremely fragile” (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which was ranked 15th; UNDP, 2021).

## What You Can Do About It

You should continue to work with bilateral and multilateral partners to increase climate financing and improve the mechanisms through which it is delivered, coordinated, and tracked. The growing international interest in the NAP process, alongside broader changes in the international climate financing landscape, has meant that there is an increasing pot of money from which to fund both adaptation planning and implementation; the need is strong to ensure that an equitable share of this funding goes to conflict-affected states.

### **PURSUE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND PEACEBUILDING FINANCING OPPORTUNITIES**

During the NAP’s planning phase, you can access international financing from a variety of sources to support the initiation of the process. This includes the GCF’s NAP Readiness Programme, which allocates USD 3 million to all countries to strengthen institutional capacities as governments initiate their NAP process; many conflict-affected countries have already accessed some or all their available funding. Additional financial and technical support is available through bilateral providers and sources like the NAP Global Network’s Country Support Hub (<https://napglobalnetwork.org/country-support-hub/>).

You can also pursue financing for peacebuilding programming that supports actions with clear adaptation co-benefits. The [UN’s Peacebuilding Fund](#) supports integrated UN responses sustaining peace measures in fragile contexts (UN Department of Peacebuilding and Political Affairs [UNDPPA], n.d.). It is available to UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes as well as CSOs, and primarily invests in four areas: implementation of peace agreements, peace dividends, dialogue and coexistence, and re-establishment of basic services (UNDPPA, n.d.). The Peacebuilding Fund has started to address climate change as a cross-cutting and cross-border issue: at the outset of 2020, there were 31 projects planned or ongoing related to climate security (Rüttinger, 2020; UNDPPA, n.d.). These actions, including natural resource management, climate resilience, and sustainable livelihoods, are expected to continue as climate security has been identified as a core priority for the Peacebuilding Fund’s 2020–2024 strategy (Rüttinger, 2020; UNDPPA, n.d.).

### **INTEGRATE ADAPTATION INTO DOMESTIC BUDGETS**

Domestic measures are available as your government rebuilds its own budgeting and financing systems in the aftermath of violence. These begin with improving the integration of adaptation considerations into ministerial budgets, with associated capacity building for budget officers on

climate change and adaptation. You can also explore options for raising or redistributing revenues for adaptation through mechanisms like taxes, levies, subsidy reform, or the establishment of a domestic climate change fund—though NAP teams must acknowledge the difficulties of doing so in a context of weak governance and institutions (Parry et al., 2017).

### **Box 2. The need for increased, smarter climate financing to fragile states**

Outside of the control of government, international financing sources need to consider the unique attributes of peacebuilding contexts and adjust their processes to better reflect the realities faced by fragile states. Similar adjustments have been made, for example, for small island developing states (Wong & Cao, 2022). There is little consideration of conflict and fragility in approved GCF funding proposals, and critics have identified barriers for fragile states in accessing this financing, including data and information requirements that cannot be fulfilled in contexts defined by instability (Emanuel et al., 2021; UNDP, 2021). Possible solutions could include establishing programs within institutions like the Global Environment Facility (GEF) that are specifically focused on delivering climate financing in contexts of conflict and fragility; qualifying peace dividends within climate finance applications to incentivize investment; and having representatives from fragile and/or conflict-affected countries sit on the decision-making panels of climate financing institutions (Wong & Cao, 2022).

These potential solutions require deeper integration of conflict sensitivity into climate financing programs. A 2020 evaluation by the GEF's Independent Evaluation Office, studying the Facility's environmental programming (including climate change), found that one-third of its total portfolio was invested in conflict-affected countries (GEF, 2020). The report found that conflict and fragility have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood that a GEF-funded project would be cancelled, delayed, or dropped because of instability and recommended that the GEF Secretariat develop guidance for conflict-sensitive programming across the program life cycle. The report also recommended that a definition, policy, and procedures be developed for investing in these contexts, which is advice that could be extended to all climate financing mechanisms that do not currently include such considerations (GEF, 2020). The broader application of conflict sensitivity in climate financing can help improve risk management for financing bodies and mechanisms (Climate Home News, 2021; Wong & Cao, 2022).

There are advantages to allocating domestic funds for adaptation: it promotes more national ownership over the NAP process, allows for more flexibility and consistency in adaptation funding than international sources, and can be used to leverage further international financing by signaling to international partners the government's commitment to the NAP process (Parry et al., 2017). A significant amount of NAP-related adaptation financing will go toward activities that also have clear peacebuilding co-benefits, including risk and vulnerability reduction, strengthening governance institutions, and capacity building. Similarly, financing for peacebuilding measures

can often have adaptation and resilience co-benefits. Communicating these co-benefits to ministries and the broader public will help make the case for budgetary allocations for adaptation—however small.

## 3.4 Institutional Arrangements and Policy Frameworks

### Why Institutional Arrangements are Important to the NAP Process

Supportive institutional arrangements and policy frameworks are critical to an effective NAP process. The former will facilitate open dialogue and collaboration among stakeholders, including horizontally across government ministries, departments, and agencies (particularly in priority sectors for adaptation); vertically among national and sub-national authorities (including local governments); and with stakeholders outside of government, including CSOs, international partners, and the private sector. Strong legal and policy frameworks support the NAP process by providing a mandate and clear guidelines on the roles, responsibilities, and requirements of those implicated in the process. Both institutional arrangements and legal and policy frameworks should be designed to ensure that decision making is representative; having gender and social inclusion experts involved, for example, is a crucial way of ensuring a broad range of voices are heard and differentiated needs and vulnerabilities are understood and acted upon (Dazé & Church, 2019).

### What's Different About Conflict-Affected Contexts

Successful alignment of adaptation and peacebuilding processes depends to a large extent on the existence of coordination mechanisms among actors working on the two complementary agendas. For conflict-affected states, this is often difficult, as the government is typically trying to rebuild governance institutions and the public service in a context defined by limited resources and staff capacities, entrenched political interests, governance legacies, donor interests, corruption, and patronage (Blum et al., 2019). Connections may have been broken between ministries and levels of governance—between local authorities in conflict-affected areas and the national government, for example. Legal and policy frameworks on the environment and climate change may be outdated and were likely de-prioritized during the conflict. Overcoming these challenges will take time. Conflict-affected states should, however, have staff—typically within the ministry or department responsible for the environment and climate change—who can be mandated to lead the NAP process and support the strengthening of linkages among stakeholders and levels of governance.

### What You Can Do About It

You should work to put into place institutional arrangements and supporting legal and policy frameworks that promote dialogue, integration, and cooperation across the adaptation and peacebuilding pillars of the development agenda. This includes identifying clear mandates, roles, and responsibilities for those mainstreaming adaptation into peacebuilding at all levels and those charged with integrating peace and conflict into the NAP.

## **PROMOTE COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE NAP AND PEACEBUILDING PROCESSES**

Once your team and mandate have been established, leaders should promote cross-sectoral collaboration between your leads and those driving the peacebuilding process—teams often found within the ministry of finance, planning, or national development. Such collaboration is a central tenet of the NAP process. Alignment is mutually beneficial, as both NAPs and peacebuilding plans provide policy-makers and practitioners with a vision for resilience and development to which they can map their activities.

Coordination between those leading the NAP and peacebuilding processes can be promoted in several ways. Begin by reviewing your country’s peacebuilding agenda, identifying counterpoints within the national peacebuilding office, briefing these colleagues on the NAP process, and inviting them to participate in stakeholder consultations throughout the process. Open dialogue between the two sides, initiated early in the NAP process and maintained across planning, implementation, and MEL, is crucial. This may require setting up a platform for dialogue and exchange between NAP and peacebuilding teams, and regular briefings and meetings between the two teams to report on progress and complementarities. Depending on resources, you can also explore opportunities for the establishment of dedicated teams or liaison positions focused on collaboration within each institution; a NAP team member, for example, could be tasked with working and coordinating with a focal point on the national peacebuilding commission or team.

You can strengthen the mandate for coordination in the early stages of the NAP process by including conflict-sensitivity and peacebuilding support as guiding principles for the NAP process. Similarly, climate risks and adaptation considerations can be integrated into iterations of the peacebuilding plan to make it more climate resilient. External organizations, such as UN country teams or regional organizations, may be able to support this coordination, acting as a bridge between ministries still in the process of rebuilding. You can also include representatives from the peacebuilding office on the NAP’s steering or oversight committee, should one exist—and offer to bring a climate adaptation perspective to any parallel group driving the peacebuilding agenda.

## **ESTABLISH A SUPPORTING LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK**

Institutional arrangements for supporting alignment of the peacebuilding and adaptation agendas should also be complemented by legal and policy frameworks. Here, relevant stakeholders can help other team members understand the frameworks within which they are undertaking adaptation actions, including how these frameworks function. Analyze whether laws and policies are in place—including those governing peacebuilding—that promote maladaptation, gender and income inequality, or marginalization in fragile settings, which could erode longer-term resilience. This could include looking at laws and policies around land tenure and resource rights and how these might contribute to tensions or a lack of investment in building resilience. Draw on external assessment as needed here, looking to what actors in civil society, the media, and academia are saying about the strength of the laws, policies, and institutions that govern both adaptation and peacebuilding.

With a view to implementation, you can also look at the permitting regime and whether opportunities might exist for fast-tracking environmental or other permits when they are required for adaptation actions—particularly those with clear peacebuilding co-benefits.

Given the dynamic nature of many post-conflict contexts and the medium- to long-term horizon of the NAP and peacebuilding agendas, the institutional arrangements established to support their alignment must also be insulated from political changes and electoral cycles.

## 3.5 Stakeholder Engagement

### Why Stakeholder Engagement is Important to the NAP Process

One of the guiding principles of the NAP process is that it must be participatory: that a wide range of stakeholders from within and outside of government should take part in the process, and that this participation should be open, transparent, and accountable (Hammill, Dekens & Dazé, 2019). The integration of climate change into medium- and long-term development planning typically involves working with several stakeholder groups throughout the NAP process: relevant ministries, departments, and agencies from within government; non-governmental actors such as CSOs, the private sector, and academia; local communities; the media; and development partners (UNFCCC, 2012). Within these groups, care must be taken to ensure that engagement is equitable and inclusive; that barriers to engagement are identified and addressed; and that the views, vulnerabilities, and needs of people in all their diversity are included in decision making.

### What's Different About Conflict-Affected Contexts

Within conflict-affected contexts, a different approach to stakeholder engagement is required due to several factors (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2020). The governments of these states may not have complete control over their territory, restricting their ability to act in those areas where the rule of law is weak or missing. The continued presence of armed non-state actors could jeopardize the delivery of adaptation actions and undermine resilience. There is often a lack of trust among stakeholders, each with their own agendas, grievances, tensions, and inequalities that will need to be understood and integrated into the strategies that the government uses to reach out to different actors and broker dialogue between them. This lack of trust can extend to public perceptions of the government, as institutions and capacities have likely been weakened by the conflict and budgets are overstretched, resulting in difficulties in ensuring law and order, delivering public services, and responding to the climate crisis. You may have to work hard to carefully build up this confidence again and to re-establish the social contract between a government and its citizens.

## What You Can Do About It

Climate change may present an opening for engaging with stakeholders in a conflict-affected context; as a shared challenge, it may offer a more neutral topic with which to engage stakeholders.

### **BRING PEACEBUILDING STAKEHOLDERS INTO THE PROCESS**

Working in conflict-affected states, you must engage with stakeholder groups that are typically not involved in climate action. The list changes somewhat; national and international humanitarian and peacebuilding organizations will play an important role, as will security forces, UN agencies, and even potentially armed non-state actors, while the role of the private sector—for example—may be different as that sector recovers from the violence. You may be able to work indirectly in those regions outside of government control through local and international humanitarian and peacebuilding organizations, providing them with the climate data, information, and policy directions they need to integrate adaptation into their programming. Before engaging with any stakeholders, you must understand the dynamics that exist among these groups and how those dynamics are linked to peace and conflict. A conflict analysis and stakeholder mapping exercise, discussed in Section 4, can help build this understanding.

Effective participation in the NAP process will often depend on the engagement of local authorities, who can relay messages to and speak for their constituents. This will increase the reach of your team's communications, help ensure that local and sector perspectives are reflected in the NAP, and secure buy-in from those who will be directly involved in implementing adaptation and peacebuilding actions.

Outside government, engagement with stakeholder associations and networks, such as coordinating bodies for humanitarian and peacebuilding actors or donors, private sector actors, the media, or CSOs, can also help you reach more stakeholders, though the state may have to support these associations in the post-conflict context. Care must be taken in the selection of representatives from different constituencies; the mapping exercise described in Section 4 can help you understand how these different actors relate to each other and identify potential risks.

### **DRAW ON UN AND INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE WHERE APPROPRIATE**

Within the UN system, the Peacebuilding Commission and CSM are two bodies that can help you with alignment. The UN Peacebuilding Commission is a good vehicle for climate change and peacebuilding conversations, as it approaches peacebuilding support with a strong gender lens, can help mobilize economic resources for peacebuilding, promotes civil society engagement in the process, and regularly informs and interacts with other UN bodies and member states on peace and security issues (Rüttinger, 2020). The CSM was established by the UN system to work toward cross-cutting solutions to the impact that climate change has on peace and security, and vice versa (UN Department of Peacebuilding and Political Affairs, 2021). These are just two examples of UN and international bodies that can support your team in bringing together stakeholders to align NAP and peacebuilding agendas.



## 3.6 Capacity Development

### Why Capacity Development is Important to the NAP Process

Individual and institutional capacity development is central to the NAP process. NAP teams must work to ensure that government staff (including those driving the peacebuilding process) and partners have the knowledge and skills to understand and use climate data and information; integrate gender-responsiveness into all aspects of the NAP process; conduct and use conflict analysis and climate vulnerability assessments; integrate climate risk management into relevant policies, programs, and projects; design and operationalize appropriate MEL frameworks; and, crucially, identify and secure sources of financing for the NAP. An important early step will be conducting a capacity-gap analysis to understand which capacities are already in place and which must be further developed (UNFCCC, 2012).

### What's Different About Conflict-Affected Contexts

Periods of violence, often quite long, will have restricted the capacity of the state to deliver key functions, like providing security, resolving conflicts, and carrying out elections (Baser, 2011). Re-establishing these functions in fragile or post-conflict settings can be difficult, as skilled professionals have fled, resources are often stretched, trust is frayed, infrastructure is damaged, and political in-fighting is pervasive. Within these contexts, NAP teams and their partners must work to identify and address the capacities needed to provide climate training for peacebuilding practitioners and conflict training for adaptation programmers.

The content and delivery of capacity-building programs need to be designed and rooted in the national context (Baser, 2011) and cannot be perceived to be favouring certain groups over others. Participation should be gender equitable, and programs should be designed around gender differences in adaptation and peacebuilding needs and capacities. They must promote the principles of inclusivity, transparency, and participation, and facilitators delivering these programs should themselves receive training on operationalizing these principles. This will help ensure that a broad selection of stakeholders have access to capacity building. It may be beyond the capacity of a government to deliver these kinds of training opportunities on its own. In such cases, the state can invite partners, such as CSOs and international organizations, to design and deliver these programs.

### What You Can Do About It

Increasing individual and organizational capacities will not only help NAP teams deliver public services and functions (such as planning) but can also increase a state's legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate (Baser, 2011).

## **BUILD CAPACITIES AMONG ADAPTATION PRACTITIONERS ON CONFLICT-SENSITIVE ADAPTATION PLANNING**

Climate change practitioners, including your NAP team, may require capacity building on how to integrate conflict and peacebuilding considerations into their work. This includes making the NAP process conflict sensitive, to better understand its potential impacts on peace and conflict dynamics. Within this work, you may focus on translating and integrating climate risk assessments into conflict analyses, and vice versa, as well as integrating the results of these assessments into adaptation project or program design, implementation, and MEL. Local and national government staff, partners, and consultants need to understand conflict sensitivity as a lens to be applied to their work, and be aware of the conflict context and their own biases and roles in it as they implement adaptation projects (Angelini & Jones, 2022; Campbell, 2011; The Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012; U.K. Government Stabilization Unit, 2016). Revisit any assessments of capacity gaps periodically as the NAP and peacebuilding processes progress and address any gaps among new and existing staff and stakeholders accordingly.

## **EXPAND SKILLS AMONG PEACEBUILDING PRACTITIONERS ON CLIMATE-RESILIENT PEACEBUILDING**

Peacebuilders operating in conflict-affected states—both within and outside of government—may need technical skills to effectively participate in the NAP process, as often they do not come to their work with a detailed understanding of climate change and the differentiated vulnerabilities of social groups in a peacebuilding context. They may need support from your NAP team to understand climate change adaptation, the NAP process, and their potential roles in its development and implementation.

Specifically, peacebuilding practitioners may need support to understand current and expected climate change at the global, national, and local levels; how these changes may impact conflict dynamics, their operations, and their outcomes; and where they can find and how they can use climate data and information to increase the resilience of their work and the communities they serve, including traditionally marginalized groups. The latter might include, for example, training on how to integrate local-level climate forecasts into the design of more sustainable livelihood strategies; the importance of gender-responsive adaptation to the design and implementation of peacebuilding actions; or the ways nature-based climate solutions can simultaneously deliver biodiversity, adaptation, and peacebuilding benefits to targeted communities. Your NAP team is likely well placed to support the design and delivery of such capacity development for peacebuilders.

## **STRENGTHEN CAPACITY TO IDENTIFY AND SECURE CLIMATE AND PEACEBUILDING FINANCING**

Training may also be required on international climate and peacebuilding financing sources, so that adaptation actors from government, CSOs, and the private sector, alongside peacebuilding practitioners, understand and can access funding for programming that meets both peacebuilding and adaptation objectives. Domestically, your NAP team can help with capacity building that may

be required for budget officers from across the government’s ministries to integrate adaptation actions into national and ministerial budgets and to better absorb and manage external and often relatively large-scale support for climate action.

### Good Practice Example 2: Iraq

Iraq’s GCF Readiness Proposal with the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) plans for extensive stakeholder consultation and participatory approaches to design and implement the NAP process. Iraq’s strategies for development since the 2000s have included extensive CSO engagement at the national and local levels. This engagement will be continued for the NAP process through working groups, which consist of government ministries, local authorities, the private sector, parliamentary committees, and representatives of CSOs. As a part of capacity building, a series of induction workshops will be held on the importance of the NAP process. For countries interested in replicating this working-group model, trainings could be expanded to include certain participants or groups training each other on their tools and systems, such as peacebuilding, climate change adaptation, and gender stakeholders. It may be appropriate to include security organizations and the military as working-group participants for some contexts.

In Iraq, the working groups will then be divided into “sectoral task forces,” each working on planning for a specific sector (e.g., health, agriculture, sanitation), and a cross-sectoral task force dealing with gender, human settlements, and livelihoods. In the future, or for other countries, there is opportunity here to add a “peacebuilding” working group to the cross-cutting task force.

# 4 Conflict-Sensitizing Your NAP Process

This section focuses on entry points<sup>3</sup> and strategic actions to integrate conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding considerations into the NAP process. These opportunities span all three phases of the NAP process: planning (including “laying the groundwork” and “preparatory elements”), implementation, and MEL. They are broadly categorized to align with the UNFCCC LEG Technical Guidelines for the NAP Process (2012).<sup>4</sup> We describe each entry point along with advice on specific steps, key tools, suggested resources for further information, and practical examples.

Your country does not need to have an existing peace plan or peace process for the entry points to be applicable to your NAP process. This guidance is largely focused on applying a conflict-sensitivity lens to the NAP process, to encourage alignment with—at minimum—“Do No Harm” principles, while also offering opportunities to align with peacebuilding processes. Over time, as a NAP process’s enabling factors are strengthened and the capacities of the NAP and peacebuilding teams are developed, your NAP process may evolve from one that is conflict sensitive to one that includes distinct peacebuilding objectives.

**Table 4. Entry points and recommended actions for conflict-sensitizing the NAP process**

Step in LEG Technical Guidelines	Entry point	Recommended action
A1	Initiating and launching the NAP process	Commit to a conflict-sensitive NAP process

<sup>3</sup> Contexts and country situations vary, meaning each entry point may not be relevant or possible to apply in every NAP process. This section offers several opportunities to incorporate conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding mechanisms into the NAP process, and you are encouraged to apply what is possible and best suits your country’s unique context.

<sup>4</sup> The LEG Technical Guidelines offer a framework for countries to follow as they design their NAP processes. The Guidelines offer support through four stages, each with four or five steps: A. Lay the Groundwork and Address Gaps; B. Preparatory Elements; C. Implementation Strategies; D. Reporting, Monitoring, and Review. In general, Phases A and B can fall under “planning,” Phase C under both “planning” and “implementation,” and Phase D under “MEL” of the NAP process cycle.

Step in LEG Technical Guidelines	Entry point	Recommended action
A2	Stocktaking	Complete a conflict analysis as part of the stocktaking exercise
B2	Assessing climate variabilities and identifying adaptation options	Integrate conflict considerations into vulnerability and risk assessments, and design more detailed conflict-sensitive adaptation measures
B3	Reviewing and appraising adaptation options	Review and prioritize adaptation measures identified through the vulnerability and risk assessment (VRA) against the conflict analysis
B4	Compiling and communicating NAPs	Raise awareness around the potential conflict implications of climate change, and the benefits of aligning adaptation and peacebuilding
B5	Integrating climate change adaptation into development planning and sectors	Align the NAP with the peacebuilding process
C2	Developing implementation strategies for adaptation	Conflict-sensitize the NAP implementation strategy
C4	Promoting coordination and synergy at the regional level and with other multilateral environmental agreements	Include transboundary issues and agreements, such as migration and conservation, in NAP processes
D1	Monitoring the NAP process	Integrate peace and conflict considerations into the MEL approaches of the NAP process
D2	Reviewing the NAP process	Review progress on addressing conflict risks and peacebuilding opportunities through the NAP process
D3	Iteratively updating the NAPs	Update the conflict analysis based on learning

Step in LEG Technical Guidelines	Entry point	Recommended action
D4	Conducting outreach and reporting	Communicate outputs and impacts of the NAP process on national or sub-national peace and resilience

Source: UNFCCC, 2012.

## 4.1 Planning

### Entry point in the LEG Guidelines:

↳ A.1. Initiating and launching the NAP process

### Recommended Action: Commit to a conflict-sensitive NAP process

#### WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?

Committing to a conflict-sensitive NAP process will help ensure adaptation actions in conflict-affected states: a) do not create or exacerbate conflicts; and b) identify and act upon opportunities to build peace and resilience.

#### HOW IS IT DONE?

- Setting conflict sensitivity, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding as guiding principles and key approaches for your NAP process at the outset, for example in your country's NAP document or NAP framework.
- Securing high-level support for prioritizing conflict sensitivity in the NAP process and in supporting adaptation policies and processes (UN Sustainable Development Group, 2022). This could include getting the ministers of relevant parts of government, such as environment/climate change or planning/peacebuilding, or even the Head of State to issue individual or joint statements or mandates committing to integrating conflict and peace considerations into the NAP.
- Grounding the design and implementation of the NAP process in a solid understanding of the conflict context (see next entry point).
- Engaging peacebuilding actors and advocates in the NAP process from the beginning. This might involve, for example, developing an outreach strategy to the relevant parts of government, civil society, and academia to raise their awareness about climate change adaptation and the NAP process and how it is relevant to the peacebuilding agenda.

### Good Practice Example 3: Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia

#### Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Democratic Republic of the Congo NAP (Deputy Prime Minister's Office, 2022) lists "conflict sensitivity and social cohesion" as a guiding principle for the NAP process. In doing so, it commits to including all groups targeted by adaptation interventions into the NAP's planning, implementation, and monitoring processes, to promote relationship building, equitable outcomes, and further long-term peace and prosperity. NAP measures that specifically bring people together will be prioritized, and conflict sensitivity will be integrated throughout the NAP process and its future iterations.

#### Somalia

The Federal Government of Somalia integrated conflict considerations into its proposal to the GCF for NAP Readiness funding. The proposal, developed with UNDP as a delivery partner, highlights the role that climate change plays in exacerbating conflict drivers in Somalia and undermining the government's peacebuilding efforts, and the ways in which adaptation can support peacebuilding (UNDP & Somali Republic, 2019). In support of this, Somalia's NAP Framework, which lays out the government's vision for its NAP process, stresses the need to align its NAP process with national peacebuilding efforts and for conflict sensitivity to be a guiding principle for adaptation actions (Directorate of Environment and Climate Change, 2022).

#### Entry point in the LEG Guidelines:

↳ A.2. Stocktaking: Identifying available information on climate change impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation, and assessing gaps and needs of the enabling environment for the NAP process

 **Recommended Action:** Complete a conflict analysis as part of the stocktaking exercise

#### WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?

Conducting a conflict analysis during the stocktaking phase of the NAP process will ensure that adaptation actions are designed and implemented in ways that reflect the conflict context, including its actors, dynamics, causes, and impacts. This will strengthen all parts of the process; for example, a conflict analysis will help you better understand which stakeholders you should engage, how and when you should involve them, how they might perceive the NAP and associated adaptation programming, and how this perception could impact the conflict.

## HOW IS IT DONE?

- Identifying the conflict(s) affecting your country, as there may be more than one conflict (involving different actors, at different scales, over different issues, and so on) that need to be considered in the NAP.
- Developing a better understanding of the conflict causes, dynamics, differentiated impacts, and actors.
- Identifying how the design and implementation of adaptation actions may influence these dimensions of the conflict context in both positive and negative ways, including how the government, as a central actor in both conflict/peacebuilding and adaptation, interacts with and influences this conflict context.

Many resources offer examples and guidance on how to conduct a conflict analysis (see, for example, Campbell, 2011; The Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012; FAO, 2019; Network for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, 2020; Tänzler & Scherer, 2019; International Alert, 2004; and more), and the approach chosen will depend on your context, available resources, and participants involved. Check with peacebuilding and humanitarian colleagues to see if they have already conducted or are conducting a conflict analysis; much of this information may have already been gathered by partners.

## CONDUCTING A CONFLICT ANALYSIS: START WITH A DESK-BASED REVIEW

As a first step, conduct a desk-based review to deepen your understanding of the conflict context at the national or, if more relevant, the regional or sub-national level. Conducting this review before stakeholder engagement will identify who should be involved in further analysis and how to account for biases in reporting. Draw from a range of information sources, such as datasets, articles, and reports, from diverse actors, such as government ministries, the media, academia, CSOs, and international organizations.

The desk-based review should cover the core aspects of each conflict considered: timeline; geography; what the conflict is about (including triggers, conflict lines, and root causes); key impacts (on people of all genders and social groups); which actors or groups are involved (including the dividers and connectors between them); and conflict trends (such as whether violence slows during winter months or the rainy season). See UNICEF's concept of a conflict "thumbnail" for one model of a review (2016a). An initial mapping exercise of stakeholders, actors, and power dynamics can be part of the desk review, as some of these stakeholders may also be involved in the NAP process. Identifying and studying key actors will ensure adaptation actions are conducted with the right people and groups in the right ways.

Importantly, in conducting the desk-based review, try to identify an initial list of drivers or capacities for peacebuilding and reconciliation. These are the connections and opportunities among groups that encourage communication and can help build trust and dialogue. Examples can include local women's groups, back-channel communications between opposing political parties, shared market spaces, or traditional and Indigenous dispute-resolution or peace



mechanisms (FAO, 2019; UNICEF, 2016b). These connectors can be used as the building blocks for peace throughout the NAP process.

The review can be complemented and validated by internal government discussions, which can help identify how the conflict context may influence or be influenced by the NAP process. This will involve soliciting outside perspectives of and experiences with the conflict to prevent biases from creating gaps in programming or aggravating tensions. This is also an opportunity to reflect on your own assumptions and biases regarding the conflict, as your NAP team can be a key stakeholder within the conflict context as well as the NAP process (The Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012).

### **COMPLETING THE DESK-BASED REVIEW WITH PARTICIPATORY CONFLICT ANALYSIS**

The desk-based review of the conflict context and actors will need to be expanded and validated through stakeholder workshops, sometimes complemented by interviews and field studies, to provide further detail and insights into the conflict, its dynamics, and the potential for climate change to exacerbate risks. Several tools exist for designing a participatory conflict analysis (see Key Tools), and many organizations have their own versions and approaches for using them. Explore opportunities for combining this analysis with the climate VRAs undertaken for the NAP process, given that both are participatory and will likely involve similar stakeholders.

The selection of stakeholders to participate in the conflict analysis needs to be guided by the more neutral desk-based review, include as wide a variety of perspectives as possible, and encourage local ownership of the resulting programming (Network for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, 2020; Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2006; Tänzler et al., 2022). In addition to government agencies, diverse representatives from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), CSOs, women's groups, and underrepresented groups should be involved in the participatory conflict analysis, as well as human rights defenders, environmental activists, and community leaders. This broad participation can also support peacebuilding by encouraging communication among groups and strengthening bonds among them based on an evolving understanding of the conflict context and may help identify new opportunities for peace. That said, it is important to remember that in fragile contexts, there may be risks associated with participation in these processes, and as such you should use caution when engaging stakeholders and collecting and storing information: ensuring that consultations happen in a safe space, for example, and making sure that sensitive data is collected anonymously when possible.

### **ENSURING GENDER AND DIVERSITY ARE EMBEDDED IN THE CONFLICT ANALYSIS**

The conflict analysis must integrate gender and other forms of diversity to understand the differentiated roles, capacities, and vulnerabilities of various groups. Applying a gender lens when conducting a conflict analysis allows you to examine, for example, the socio-economic roles and responsibilities of people of different genders and the associated risks and vulnerabilities they face; an understanding of gender differences in the use of, control of, and access to natural resources; the existing roles and power relations among different genders; and how gender influences the

ways people cope with conflict and climate variability (International Alert, 2021; Network for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, 2020). Beyond gender, other intersectional factors that may be important to consider include age, disability, ethnicity, and indigeneity. Including women and other underrepresented groups in the design of questionnaires and methodologies will further benefit the analysis.

Once completed, the analysis will inform the scope of the NAP; which stakeholders to involve; the design of vulnerability assessments and MEL frameworks; and the selection, design, and implementation of adaptation actions.

### **Box 3. Key tools for a conflict analysis**

#### **Conflict and Context “Thumbnail”**

A tool that can aid in the desk-based review process, it organizes the conflict histories, issues, and status in a summary to give a sense of the overall conflict. This UNICEF tool suggests questions about conflict that will best inform a later conflict analysis, organized around stakeholders, root and proximate causes, conflict triggers, conflict dynamics, and peace capacities (UNICEF, 2016b). The summary can also provide an early opportunity to identify how climate change might contribute to the conflict or post-conflict context, and to situate the NAP process within this context.

<https://www.unicef.org/media/96581/file/Guide-to-Conflict-Analysis.pdf>

#### **Conflict Tree**

A visual tool that allows stakeholders to identify the core conflict or problem (the tree’s trunk), the root causes of the conflict (the roots), and the effects of the conflict (the branches). Identification of root causes and effects allows stakeholders to begin to visualize connections between specific roots and branches, as well as entry points for actions, that is, those roots or branches that can be addressed through the NAP process.

[https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/csc\\_manual.pdf](https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/csc_manual.pdf)

#### **Stakeholder Mapping**

A tool to analyze and visualize relationships among the various actors in a conflict. It includes examining the relative power and influence of stakeholders, their relationships with one another, and the issues, interests, and needs that divide or connect them (see Dividers and Connectors Analysis). In reviewing the different actors, it is useful to flag those who are directly affected by or involved in the NAP process, including in the design and implementation of adaptation priorities. Resources for stakeholder analyses and mapping include: FAO, 2019, 2020; Hammill et al., 2009; Network for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, 2020; UNDP, 2016; and UNICEF, 2016b.

[https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/csc\\_manual.pdf](https://www.iisd.org/system/files/publications/csc_manual.pdf)

### **Conflict Timeline**

A tool for understanding the history and evolution of a conflict, where key events, actions, and impacts are recorded to help explain the current situation (Tearfund, 2018). This exercise is best repeated with different stakeholder groups, as each may have their own perceptions or versions of how events unfolded; combined, these timelines can reveal different points of view of the same conflict. In preparing the timeline, it may be useful to note where climate-related events or issues are mentioned, such as if an extreme weather event was a contributing factor or trigger in the conflict.

<https://res.cloudinary.com/tearfund/image/fetch/https://learn.tearfund.org/-/media/learn/resources/series/reveal/a2---conflict-timeline.pdf>

### **Dividers and Connectors Analysis**

A method of understanding a conflict by identifying the factors that unite people (connectors) and those that push people apart (dividers). As part of the conflict-sensitivity approach, it is a helpful way for understanding the everyday issues and factors—the things people do, think about, talk about—that increase or reduce tensions between people or groups. Track the extent to which climate-relevant or -adjacent issues come up in these discussions. These may include climate-related cycles and trends around natural resource availability, household or community capacities and efforts to manage climate risks, or perceptions of institutional capacity to respond to climate events.

<https://www.cdacollaborative.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Using-Dividers-and-Connectors.pdf>

### **Pro-Peace Analysis**

With a focus on identifying non-violent solutions, this type of analysis identifies the issues and actors that promote dialogue and cooperation, and reveals structures and mechanisms for conflict resolution and peacebuilding (Tänzler et al., 2022). In terms of links to the NAP process, activities that promote civil society engagement, gender and inclusivity, co-management of (natural, climate-sensitive) resources, early warning and prevention, and strengthened governance are all examples of pro-peace efforts that might be identified and better defined through such an analysis.

[https://adelphi.de/en/system/files/mediathek/bilder/cc\\_31-2022\\_guidelines\\_for\\_conflict-sensitive\\_adaptation\\_to\\_climate\\_change.pdf](https://adelphi.de/en/system/files/mediathek/bilder/cc_31-2022_guidelines_for_conflict-sensitive_adaptation_to_climate_change.pdf)

#### Good Practice Example 4: South Sudan

To identify cross-cutting strategies between sectoral agendas and the NAP process, South Sudan's recent NAP identifies the need for a conflict analysis at the local and national scales. These analyses can aid in determining potential interactions between climate change and existing or emerging threats that shape the current conflict. They can also identify opportunities for joint peacebuilding and adaptation actions, and for adding peacebuilding–adaptation objectives into policy frameworks at all levels of government. In addition, the broader NAP recognizes the knowledge gaps in understanding the climate migration–conflict nexus and that to facilitate conflict resolution through adaptation, the NAP process must generate more research on the links between natural resource degradation, climate change, and conflict.

#### Entry point in the LEG Guidelines:

- ↳ B.2. Assessing climate vulnerabilities and identifying adaptation options at the sector, sub-national, national, and other appropriate levels
- ↳ B.2.A. Assess vulnerability to climate change at sector, subnational, national or appropriate levels

### **Recommended Action: Integrate conflict considerations into climate vulnerability and risk assessments**

#### WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?

Broadly speaking, VRAs involve characterizing a broader development context and priorities; identifying the different climate and non-climate stressors that affect a country, population, or sector; examining whether, how, and why different places and people are vulnerable to these stressors; understanding (and ranking) the expected impacts of climate change on different places and people, given climate projections and identified vulnerabilities; and identifying options to reduce vulnerability to climate change.

The conflict analysis will inform the climate vulnerability and risk assessments (VRAs) typically undertaken near the outset of the NAP process. Climate VRAs help teams understand how and why a sector, location, or community is vulnerable to climate and non-climate stressors, as well as the capacities of stakeholders to deal with the impacts of these stressors (Cook et al., 2016). Adaptive capacities in conflict-affected settings are often weakened by violence, but they can also be expanded, given the resilience needed to live under such difficult circumstances. VRAs provide a basis for designing appropriate interventions to reduce exposure and vulnerability and strengthen adaptive capacities. Because conflict can be a key driver of climate vulnerability, integrating it into VRAs creates a more accurate basis upon which to design and implement adaptation actions.

## HOW IS IT DONE?

- Including the active and potential conflicts identified during the conflict analysis in characterizing the development context and as one of the non-climate stressors that may affect the people, places, or sectors you are assessing.
- Identifying whether and how the identified conflict(s) can directly (or indirectly) increase the exposure and vulnerability of systems and populations to climate impacts. For example:
  - Is the conflict pushing people into places more exposed to climate hazards?
  - Is the conflict affecting people's ability to cope with and adapt to climate-related shocks or stresses by increasing or undermining their access to or control of natural resources; the physical/built environment; their financial resources, knowledge, and skill levels; their key social relationships or networks; or the decision-making processes that support their livelihoods?
- At the same time, identifying how climate change might influence conflict risks faced by the population. For example:
  - Will climate change impacts lead to migration, moving people to places that will change livelihoods, increase pressure on and competition over resources, or lead to conflicts between host communities and new arrivals?
  - Will climate change affect people's access to or control of natural resources; the physical/built environment; their financial resources, knowledge, and skills levels; their key social relationships or networks; or the decision-making processes that support livelihoods?
  - Might these effects, in turn, exacerbate conflict risks by decreasing incomes and food security, increasing unemployment and competition over resources, making people more susceptible to recruitment by organized crime or armed groups, or eroding trust in public institutions?
  - Are there climate-related conflict drivers or triggers (identified during the conflict analysis) that might be exacerbated by future climate change?
- Identifying adaptation options that reduce conflict risk, considering conflict drivers, triggers, actors, dividers, connectors, and local capacities for peace. For example, identifying adaptation actions that support community cohesion and build trust (U.K. Government Stabilization Unit, 2016). See Good Practice Example 5.
- Ensuring that the design and conduct of the VRA process itself is conflict sensitive to ensure staff and stakeholder safety amid ongoing tensions or violence and ensure that the VRA itself does not exacerbate tensions among stakeholders.

Findings from the VRAs can also be fed back into the reports and literature reviewed in the stocktaking, desk-based review, and conflict analysis (see previous step). This iterative approach to analysis inserts climate change risk and considerations into the broader peacebuilding context of the country and can help peace actors identify climate-related risks and opportunities outside the NAP process.

## Box 4. Key tools

There are several approaches and toolkits for climate VRAs, many of which include analyses of the socio-economic context and non-climate risks and drivers of vulnerability. While not specifically focused on conflict, conflict considerations can be integrated into the following approaches:

### **Climate Vulnerability and Capacity Analysis (CVCA)**

CARE's CVCA process (updated in 2019) provides a basis for working with stakeholders to identify options for building their resilience to climate change. It uses participatory and secondary research to gain a locally specific understanding of vulnerability to climate change and existing resilience capacities. This includes socio-economic and gender analyses, which can offer an opportunity to explore household and community-level conflicts. Stakeholders may also identify conflict as a driver of climate vulnerability or reduced adaptive capacity.

<https://careclimatechange.org/cvca/>

### **Climate Vulnerability Assessment**

Released in 2016 as an annex to USAID's Climate-Resilient Development Framework, this assessment methodology provides guidance on how to frame a VRA at various levels (sector, country, project, municipality); outlines basic concepts that underpin VRAs (including climate and non-climate stressors, exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity); explores some of the tools, techniques, and resources available to those carrying out VRAs; and links VRAs to decision making in adaptation planning and implementation.

[https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PA00KZ84.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00KZ84.pdf)

### **Assessment of Climate-Related Risks**

Published in 2021, this GIZ resource is framed around the understanding that climate risk assessments form the basis of climate risk management. It provides a six-step methodology for participative VRAs that identify climate risks; assess impacts on people, assets, value chains, infrastructure, settlements, and ecosystems; and support identification of response options.

<https://www.giz.de/en/downloads/giz2021-en-climate-related-risk.pdf>

### Good Practice Example 5: Adaptation options for improved security

Several countries have integrated adaptation activities and objectives that specifically address peace and conflict concerns. Brazil's NAP<sup>5</sup> includes equipping water resources management authorities at the basin level with experienced negotiators in response to increasing demands on and disputes over water resources. South Sudan's NAP prioritizes several actions to strengthen policy and planning around climate change adaptation and peacebuilding, including conflict-resolution principles that have been agreed upon by all stakeholders, which can be referenced during resource disputes. Togo's NAP plans for pastoral corridors, water points and troughs for herders, and for conflict-mediation training for civil servants in the livestock sector. The Central African Republic has designed multiple adaptation measures with resource-related conflict resolution in the objectives for the livestock and agriculture sectors.

Burkina Faso's NAP seeks to improve the security of pastoralist livelihoods through better communication about relevant resources and access information. In addition to explicitly noting "improving security" in the overall program objectives, the project also lists "promote lasting social peace by reducing tensions relating to pastoral conflict" as a specific objective. Lastly, a long-term expected outcome is that "a climate of positive social cohesion is maintained and strengthened." These combined strategies listed at the outset of the project design are strong examples of integrating peacebuilding into NAP planning.

#### Entry point in the LEG Guidelines:

- ↳ B.2. Assessing climate vulnerabilities and identifying adaptation options at the sector, sub-national, national, and other appropriate levels
- ↳ B.2C. Identify and categorize adaptation options at multiple scales to address priority vulnerabilities

### **Recommended Action:** Identify and design conflict-sensitive adaptation options

#### WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?

After completing a VRA that includes conflict considerations, you can move on to the identification of conflict-sensitive adaptation options (Step B.2.C). Design should be informed by the conflict analysis and VRA(s); in some cases, where the adaptation options are more targeted in terms of geography or population, a more project-level or local-level conflict analysis might be warranted to ensure alignment between adaptation and peacebuilding objectives.

<sup>5</sup> Measure proposed in Sections 8.4 and 8.5 Water Resources Management, with the goal to increase the capacity of institutions to respond to uncertainties and changing future scenarios (pp. 151, 159).

## HOW IS IT DONE?

- Reviewing the stated goal or objectives: Does the adaptation option address any sources of tension or peacebuilding? If so, how? If not, could it (even unintentionally)?
- Considering whether the anticipated outcomes of proposed adaptation options support peacebuilding objectives. Are shared drivers of climate and conflict vulnerability being addressed?
- Assessing activities with a view to how the distribution of resources, such as wages, equipment, other materials, and opportunities, such as for training, engagement with decision-makers, or travel, could create or exacerbate conflicts or opportunities for peacebuilding. Might these activities carry unintended risks associated with legitimizing specific conflict stakeholders? Could they distort or otherwise impact local or national markets and supply chains, or be open to theft or diversion?
- Looking at who the beneficiaries are, why and how they were selected, and how they are linked to the conflict context (i.e., are they on the stakeholder map, or affiliated with actors on the stakeholder map, from a conflict analysis?).
- Identifying whether the proposed geographic location or sector to be targeted is linked to the conflict. If so, how?
- Evaluating whether the proposed timing of the adaptation option could either positively or negatively impact conflict dynamics or peacebuilding efforts. For example, could an infusion of adaptation funding into a particular area or to a particular stakeholder group negatively impact power dynamics during delicate peacebuilding negotiations or activities?
- Realistically assessing feasibility. In the context of the NAP process, adaptation options will seek to achieve adaptation (climate-resilient development) objectives first and foremost and pursue peacebuilding as a secondary intent where possible and appropriate (UNICEF, 2016a). Any peacebuilding objectives associated with adaptation options should be honest about what can realistically be achieved. As noted in the enabling factors section, transparency is important to avoid raising expectations among stakeholders, as a perceived failure to deliver may aggravate tensions (International Alert, 2021).

Importantly, adaptation options designed for a conflict context must factor in gender dynamics and capacities for peace. Key considerations for integrating gender into the design of conflict-sensitive adaptation options include: understanding how women and excluded groups can be supported to participate; seeking opportunities to put women and underrepresented groups in central roles for implementation; considering safety and trust between vulnerable groups and security sector forces when designing programs that involve both; and anticipating what support environmental and human rights defenders who are women or from underrepresented groups may need when involved in projects (European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, 2021). Of course, women and people who face discrimination can also be perpetrators of violence, by choice or from the need to survive, and this cannot be overlooked (European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, 2021).



## Entry point in the LEG Guidelines:

↳ B.3. Reviewing and appraising adaptation options

## **Recommended Action:** Review and prioritize adaptation measures identified through the VRA against the conflict analysis

### WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?

During your appraisal of adaptation options, look at how those measures identified through the VRA exercise will interact with the peace and conflict context in which they will be implemented to ensure that, at minimum, actions do not unintentionally increase conflict risk or undermine the peacebuilding process. While the previous step of integrating the conflict analysis into the VRA might have led to identification of specific adaptation options that have conflict prevention or peacebuilding co-benefits, this exercise looks at *all* adaptation options and appraises them against the conflict context (The Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012; Network for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, 2020).

### HOW IS IT DONE?

- Involving peacebuilding practitioners and policy-makers with a deep understanding of conflict dynamics.
- Considering how different options will impact existing or potential conflicts, including the security of people of different genders and social groups.
- Identifying potential conflict triggers, such as drought-induced water scarcity, commodity price volatility, land disputes, or elections, and analyzing how adaptation options will address the conflict risks associated with these triggers (Network for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, 2020; Tearfund, 2018).
- Identifying the potential peacebuilding co-benefits of the options. This will involve looking at the conflict analysis and understanding the factors that reduce tensions and support peace and stability, such as opportunities for economic or livelihood diversification, vocational training, or engagement of traditional leaders.
- Within this assessment, looking at local and traditional knowledge, practices, and systems to cope with climate stresses, shocks, and conflict and integrating them into the adaptation options. For example, South Sudan has sought guidance from elders and identified traditional conflict resolution mechanisms as strategies to be bolstered by the NAP process, specifically concerning disputes over natural resources.

The criteria for assessing each option's appropriateness, potential effectiveness, and overall desirability should include peacebuilding co-benefits or potential to manage conflict risks. This may mean you end up with a list of prioritized adaptation actions in which some interact with

the conflict context in diverse ways, from those that directly address peace and conflict issues (drivers and triggers, social cohesion, etc.), to those that can or should be adjusted to at least “do no harm” in their design and implementation to ensure they do not exacerbate or create new tensions in a conflict-affected setting (see also the next recommendation on design, and the following section on implementation).

**Entry point in the LEG Guidelines:**

↳ B.4. Compiling and communicating NAPs

**🐦 Recommended Action:** Raise awareness of the potential conflict implications of climate change and the benefits of aligning adaptation and peacebuilding.

**WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?**

Upon finalizing and endorsing a NAP document, communicate its purpose, objectives, and associated activities to a range of interested actors so they are aware, supportive, and ready to engage with adaptation programming. In doing so, think about emphasizing the links between adaptation priorities and the conflict or peacebuilding context, as this may draw greater attention to the existence and relevance of the NAP. This means highlighting not only the role that climate change can play as a threat multiplier, but also how adaptation actions may reduce conflict risks and increase the efficacy of peacebuilding efforts.

**HOW IS IT DONE?**

- Strengthening capacities in strategic communications by developing tailored messages about the NAP process and its links to conflict and peacebuilding for different target audiences, from local authorities and CSOs to the media and national or international peacebuilding actors.
- Delivering these messages in formats and through channels most widely accessed by these audiences (Ledwell, 2018).
- Identifying and addressing barriers to information access (including gender, age, disability, income level) (Dazé & Church, 2019).
- Sensitizing stakeholders to the concept of conflict sensitivity, as not all of them may recognize the need to adopt a conflict-sensitive lens when formulating and implementing adaptation policies or programs (Tänzler et al., 2022).
- Encouraging the participation of high-level leaders and champions in promoting the NAP and its peacebuilding benefits.

### Good Practice Example 6: Central African Republic

The Central African Republic's NAP team has incorporated peacebuilding and the national peacebuilding plan "Relèvement et de Consolidation de la Paix de 2017–2021" into their NAP process. They are now planning to integrate the NAP process and adaptation objectives into the country's updated peacebuilding plan. In early 2023, a high-level dialogue among government ministries, CSOs, and the NAP team was held to raise the national profile of the NAP, to make the case to policy-makers that climate adaptation is a peacebuilding tool and should be included in the next iteration of the Central African Republic's peacebuilding plan, to advocate for increased adaptation spending and financing in sectoral budgets and donor support, and to encourage the integration of adaptation into sectoral plans and strategies.

#### Entry point in the LEG Guidelines:

↳ B.5. Integrating climate change adaptation into national and subnational development and sectoral planning

### **Recommended Action:** Integrate climate change adaptation into peacebuilding plans

#### WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?

Integrating adaptation into development planning through the NAP process is about making climate risk management standard practice rather than a separate, ad hoc exercise. Integrating conflict-sensitive adaptation into development planning ensures this standard practice does not inadvertently exacerbate conflict dynamics and instead amplifies peacebuilding effects. Done at the sub-national or sectoral levels, it allows planning to be more reflective of and responsive to specific issues, particularly conflict dynamics, that may be difficult to address in a national-level planning process. Within this process, a country's peacebuilding plan, though it's not a sector in the traditional sense, is an important entry point for integrating adaptation. Many conflict-affected country NAP teams should work with colleagues responsible for a country's peacebuilding plan to ensure adaptation considerations are integrated into associated processes, plans, and decision making. As with the integration of adaptation into development planning, this integration will be a multi-year, multi-stakeholder process; as discussed, peacebuilding and adaptation planning are both complicated processes implicating many stakeholder groups and levels of governance, and they usually share medium- to long-term timelines (UNFCCC, 2012).

## HOW IS IT DONE?

- Understanding the peacebuilding planning cycle, the processes involved in decision making around peacebuilding, and all relevant policy and legal frameworks. This will help identify opportunities for alignment and understand potential constraints to integration.
- Reviewing existing peacebuilding plans to understand the extent to which adaptation and climate considerations are already included, and if so, whether they are sufficiently considered or could be magnified.
- Mapping relevant peacebuilding stakeholders to understand their respective influences and the relationships among them: government (head of state, political/opposition parties, parliament, ministries such as planning, environment, and finance); civil society; and the international community, including bilateral donors, UN bodies, and international NGOs.
- Reaching out to peacebuilding stakeholders to sensitize them to the NAP process, the shared vulnerabilities and drivers of climate and conflict, and the peacebuilding co-benefits of adaptation planning and programming. Establish more formal coordination mechanisms if possible.
- Understanding funding and budgetary alignment and making the case for prioritizing investments with climate adaptation and peacebuilding co-benefits. This will require the design of MEL systems that track and learn from how investments in climate change adaptation are influencing peace and conflict dynamics, and how peacebuilding investments are impacting climate vulnerability.

## 4.2 Implementation

### Entry point in the LEG Guidelines:

↳ C.2. Developing a (long-term) national adaptation implementation strategy

 **Recommended Action:** Conflict-sensitize the NAP implementation strategy

### WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?

The NAP process provides a long-term strategy for implementing the country's adaptation priorities and ensuring adaptation continues to be linked to the country's development priorities and plans (UNFCCC, 2012). A conflict-sensitive NAP process works to ensure that the implementation of adaptation actions—such as the timing of activities, the choice of beneficiaries, the sequencing of actions, the mobilization of resources—does not exacerbate conflict risks and impede peacebuilding actions. Your NAP implementation strategy should be carefully designed to support peacebuilding.

## HOW IS IT DONE?

- Defining your implementation approach. What type of consultation and participation activities, such as co-design, co-management, or monitoring committees, are associated with the adaptation measures?
- Selecting implementing partners. Who will be engaged to implement activities, how were they selected, and how are they linked to the conflict? Are they on the stakeholder map, or affiliated with actors on the stakeholder map, from a conflict analysis?
- Considering whether the prioritization and sequencing of NAP activities could create any conflicts at the national or sub-national levels or complicate peacebuilding activities. For example, would immediate local investments in a particular NAP activity distract from or disrupt community-based truth and reconciliation processes? Are there peacebuilding co-benefits associated with proposed NAP activities, and is it possible to prioritize implementation of those activities with higher co-benefits?
- Selecting your project beneficiaries by targeting those stakeholders and communities most vulnerable to both climate and conflict risks. Are project beneficiaries selected with an understanding of which groups would stand to benefit from project outcomes, which would not, and the potential consequences of those dynamics? Ensure that NAP activities consider the power dynamics of affected stakeholders and their roles in conflict and peace.
- Carefully choosing geographic locations for projects and programs to ensure the safety of implementation staff and partners (European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, 2021).
- Revisiting and potentially re-designing ongoing, complementary adaptation activities in place before the NAP's implementation to ensure they reflect the findings of the conflict analysis and VRA, are designed to be conflict sensitive, and are aligned with the peacebuilding process.
- Including a code of conduct to guide implementing partner actions (U.K. Government Stabilization Unit, 2016).
- Incorporating flexibility into project design and timelines in case of sudden context shifts (European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, 2021).
- Including as a goal of NAP implementation the reduction of climate change-related drivers of conflict and conflict vulnerability.

### Good Practice Example 7: Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste's NAP process has identified and is seeking to expand the use of the traditional practice of Tara Bandu for navigating conflict. Tara Bandu is formally defined in law as an integral custom that regulates human relationships with the environment (Secretariat of State for Environment, Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, 2021). It is an Indigenous system of rules through which peace and reconciliation are established by public agreement. In pre-colonial times, Tara Bandu was widely used, and led by local chiefs who held authority, but in 1975 the Indonesian colonial government outlawed the practice. Since independence in 2002, communities have established more Tara Bandu systems to decide rules for fair resource use, such as forest conservation, fishery no-take zones, bans on certain destructive fishing methods, and bans on harvesting certain species. The NAP process will create and work through Tara Bandu mechanisms to encourage communities to build and uphold their own adaptation measures, a practice that will in turn foster community resilience and peace.

#### Entry point in the LEG Guidelines:

↳ C.4. Promoting coordination and synergy at the regional level and with other multilateral environmental agreements

### **Recommended Action:** Include transboundary issues and agreements in NAP processes

#### WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?

Climate and conflict risks often extend beyond national borders. Climate change can impact the availability of, and therefore competition for, a shared resource base. Mismanagement of shared resources by some parties, such as overextraction from or upstream pollution of a river basin, can increase vulnerabilities for all parties. Fisheries and territorial disputes over the high seas can complicate international marine management and local community resilience (Rüttinger et al., 2022). Adaptation actions on one side of a border can have implications for adaptive capacity, climate vulnerability, or security in neighbouring countries, for example, through dam construction (UN Climate Security Mechanism, 2020).

While a NAP process is, by definition, geared toward national-level action, it may also be an opportunity to recognize, align, inform, and strengthen international and national agreements on transboundary issues so that interconnected drivers of vulnerability are addressed, vulnerable populations such as migrants are protected, and conflict risks are minimized.

## HOW IS IT DONE?

- Understanding your government’s national and international environmental obligations and commitments and integrating them into the NAP process and the design and prioritization of adaptation activities.
- Identifying (during the stocktaking and conflict analysis, if possible) transboundary resources (such as river basins, aquifers, forests, fisheries, and protected areas) and issues (such as human and wildlife migration, illicit trafficking, trade, and border disputes) that may contribute to or be affected by climate and conflict risks.
- Assessing the degree to which the NAP and its activities might impact neighbouring countries and ensuring that plans are communicated to regional counterparts.
- Scanning, where available, NAP documents from neighbouring countries to understand how their adaptation priorities may have domestic consequences or opportunities for transboundary alignment and collaboration.
- Identifying transboundary agreements, institutions, or initiatives that your government is a signatory to or member of and exploring how associated commitments and activities align with national adaptation priorities. For example, could data collection or capacity-strengthening activities undertaken by a transboundary river basin commission contribute to or be informed by the implementation of a national adaptation priority around water management?
- Ensuring the perspectives and needs of migrant and refugee populations are included during the NAP process alongside those of host communities, as their respective vulnerabilities to both climate change impacts and local conflicts may have increased with the arrival of migrants.

### Good Practice Example 8: South Sudan

Box 1 in South Sudan’s NAP identifies the transnational social and environmental considerations that must be considered as climate change adaptation actions are developed. The country sits mid-stream on the Nile, sharing responsibility for the resource’s basin with the nine other countries of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI; South Sudan Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2021). The NBI has its own knowledge, strategies, and funding to protect the ecosystems and communities dependent on the Nile for survival. The NBI’s efforts have been reviewed and incorporated into the country’s NAP. Beyond shared water resources, South Sudan’s NAP also considers transboundary wildlife conservation, including protected habitats that span legal borders, as well as migration and refugee issues.

### Box 5. Refugees and migration

Migration resulting from both the impacts of climate change and conflict can spill across borders and alter socio-economic and environmental landscapes. For developing countries, particularly LDCs, the burden of migration can be considerable. Many developing countries already struggle to provide livelihoods and public services for their own populations, let alone find additional resources for often large refugee settlements, which can lead to potentially negative impacts on host communities.

Climate-induced migration is noted in several existing NAPs. For Madagascar, a key concern is the inability of the country's security forces to manage the tensions that could arise from an influx of rural migrants to the country's cities due to an increase in climate change-related rural livelihood insecurity (Ministère de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable, 2021). Peru's NAP describes the need for the government to develop an action plan to prevent and address forced migration caused by effects of climate change. This will help the state avoid increased pressure on urban infrastructures and services, which in turn could increase the possibility of social conflicts and threaten the health and well-being of migrants (Ministerio del Ambiente, 2021).

Emergency and humanitarian aid responses last 7 years on average (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2017), so the planning processes for protracted migrant crises often align with the medium-term agendas of NAP processes. The NAP process may be used to anticipate future population movements based on climate projections and co-develop regional response plans and policies with neighbouring states (South Sudan Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2021).

Not all migration events are humanitarian crises, however, and migration in and of itself can be an adaptation strategy (Barnett & Webber, 2010; Black et al., 2011). Indeed, migration has long been understood as a normal coping mechanism for populations navigating climate variability. For example, migration to urban areas during times of agricultural decline allows rural households to diversify their incomes, thereby increasing their ability to deal with shocks and stresses, including those associated with climate change.

Whatever their drivers, both internal and cross-border migration should be recognized, as appropriate, in the NAP process, and can even serve as a foundation for dialogue and trust building between nations.

## 4.3 Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning

Developing and implementing MEL frameworks that measure peace and conflict impacts and outcomes can be difficult. Peacebuilding is a highly contextual and complex process where linear or simple changes are rarely observed (Brusset et al., 2022). Changes in resilience and climate change vulnerability are equally difficult to define and measure, making MEL for adaptation in conflict-affected and fragile states particularly challenging.



## Entry point in the LEG Guidelines:

↳ D.1. Monitoring the NAP process

## **Recommended Action:** Integrate peace and conflict considerations into the MEL approaches of the NAP process

### WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?

Integrating peace and conflict considerations into the MEL framework of your NAP will help you understand how, over time, implementation of adaptation priorities impacts the broader conflict and peacebuilding context. The iterative nature of the NAP process also ensures that, should adaptation actions be underway that have not integrated peace and conflict considerations, or should the conflict context change, there are opportunities to include or adjust these considerations.

### HOW IS IT DONE?

- Developing a theory of change for the NAP process that allows you to identify the intended relationship between priority adaptation measures and the broader peace and conflict context (see Box 6).
- Within this process, using the findings from the conflict analysis and VRAs to develop outcome statements on peace and conflict. Tie them to those adaptation activities and outputs designed to address conflict drivers and impacts.
- Drawing from the conflict analysis to establish the baseline conditions against which progress will be measured.
- Monitoring the peace and conflict context throughout the NAP process, working with stakeholders to examine whether any changes in the context are attributable to implementation of adaptation options.
- Integrating conflict sensitivity into all aspects of MEL decision making: who is doing the monitoring, who is being consulted (and their position and power), what questions are asked and how they are asked, how the NAP MEL team may be perceived by the communities, and how these answers may affect the data collected, so as not to spur grievances and to manage expectations (adelphi, UNEP, & European Union [EU], n.d.).
- Securing resources to continue conflict-sensitive MEL activities for 3 to 5 years beyond the implementation of adaptation actions to understand their longer-term impacts on tensions and peace, and adjusting ongoing or future programming accordingly (adelphi, UNEP, & EU, n.d.; Peters et al., 2020).

### Box 6. Theory of change

A theory of change helps you explicitly state the NAP's conflict sensitivity or peacebuilding intentions, adds transparency, identifies assumptions and biases that need to be tested, and helps select key communities and partners for engagement (UNICEF, 2012). An ineffective theory of change can lead to unstated assumptions or personal preferences influencing program design and implementation and can lead to project failure and harm (OECD, 2007; UNICEF, 2012). Theories of change for peacebuilding involve building relationships and social cohesion, which elevate project impacts above "Do No Harm" or conflict prevention. This allows projects to plan for positive changes in human values, norms, and institutions, as well as adaptation outcomes (UNICEF, 2012).

### Box 7. Key tools

#### **Conflict sensitivity, peacebuilding, and sustaining peace (UN Sustainable Development Group, 2022)**

Lists several examples of theories of change focused on peacebuilding, including those related to resource use.

<https://unsdg.un.org/resources/good-practice-note-conflict-sensitivity-peacebuilding-and-sustaining-peace>

#### **Climate Adaptation and Theory of Change: Making it work for you (Climate Analytics, 2019)**

Highlights some of the common features of theories of change and looks at how they can be useful tools in planning and evaluating climate change projects.

<https://climateanalytics.org/publications/climate-adaptation-and-theory-of-change-making-it-work-for-you>

#### **Entry point in the LEG Guidelines:**

↳ D.2. Reviewing the NAP process

 **Recommended Action:** Review progress on addressing conflict risks and peacebuilding opportunities through the NAP process

#### **WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?**

Applying a conflict-sensitive MEL system for the NAP process will include assessing how associated adaptation activities are impacting peace and conflict dynamics over time. This

approach involves tracking how NAP implementation is contributing to achievement of the peace outcomes and objectives included in the NAP theory of change, while also revisiting the conflict context to see how it is changing and what adjustments might to program and project design might be needed. As with resilience building, attribution will often be difficult, as the adaptation activities implemented as part of the NAP process will likely be just some of many factors contributing to either positive or negative peace and conflict developments. Nevertheless, you should try to measure, evaluate, and learn from activities throughout the NAP process to ensure that positive progress or required adjustments are being made throughout implementation.

### HOW IS IT DONE?

- Establishing time frames for revisiting the conflict analysis. Understanding the broader peace and conflict context, and how it is changing over time, will allow you to better measure changes in the baseline conditions within which adaptation measures are implemented. This involves re-engaging with stakeholders as well as continuing to monitor media, academic, and other reports on local and national peace and conflict dynamics.
- Revisiting your MEL framework and indicators: Does the MEL framework, and the way it is being applied, continue to be conflict sensitive? Are the peace and conflict indicators included in the NAP's MEL framework telling you what you need to know about progress and attribution, or are adjustments required? Have new approaches to measuring peace and conflict impact emerged that should be considered for the NAP?
- Reviewing NAP activities with peace co-benefits to measure whether these co-benefits are being attained and what adjustments might be needed to deliver or enhance these co-benefits.
- Engaging diverse stakeholders in the MEL process to ensure that they understand the peace and conflict objectives of the NAP and to establish some ownership over its success.

#### Entry point in the LEG Guidelines:

↳ D.3. Iteratively updating the national adaptation plans

 **Recommended Action:** Update the NAP and associated conflict analysis based on learning

### WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?

Adjust the NAP process and adaptation priorities over time as necessary, partly in response to what you are learning about interactions with the peace and conflict context, and to how that context is changing over time. The learning phase of MEL shifts the focus from the outputs of an action or process to the outcomes: the changes in behaviour or situation among the intended beneficiaries (adelphi, UNEP, & EU, n.d.). Positive outcomes of conflict-sensitive adaptation, such as decreases in violence or increased dialogue among divided groups, are opportunities for reinforcing community cohesion and can be enhanced as the NAP process is iteratively adjusted (The Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012).

## HOW IS IT DONE?

- Conducting NAP progress reviews that measure the plan's progress over time, including progress toward or achievement of the NAP peace-related objectives and outcomes.
- Scanning for unintended conflict-escalating actions that have arisen or could arise from the project and revising adaptation measures accordingly (Tänzler & Scherer, 2019). For example, adaptation projects may unintentionally trigger tensions or reinforce divisions between groups through the distribution of NAP project or program benefits, requiring additional project adjustments. In other cases, tensions can impede certain groups' participation in adaptation projects, and adjustment may be needed to engage these stakeholders once again in the NAP process (The Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012).
- Periodically updating the conflict context to reflect the often rapidly changing and volatile nature of fragile contexts; this could mean a yearly update, or updates that are aligned with regular reporting intervals for the NAP.
- Adjusting the NAP processes as required after sudden political or security shifts (Network for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, 2020).
- Involving key staff, partners, and local stakeholders in these revisions to ensure that the analysis remains relevant and includes updated climate data and research where possible (European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, 2021). This could mean conducting short, facilitated workshops at a standard interval (e.g., every 6 months), or before key events, such as elections, that may trigger violence, to assess whether and how the project outcomes have changed.

### Entry point in the LEG Guidelines:

↳ D.4. Conducting outreach on the NAP process and reporting no progress and effectiveness

## **Recommended Action:** Communicate outputs and impacts of the NAP process on national or sub-national peace and resilience

### WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?

As the NAP's implementation is monitored, evaluated, and adjusted over time, it is important to document and share lessons learned and best practices with a broader set of stakeholders, including the media, donors, and national and international colleagues. Strategic communications will help garner further support from the public and from key stakeholders for the NAP process and its alignment with the peacebuilding process. Communications can take several forms: reports and presentations, media campaigns, and peer learning events are all ways of disseminating information, advocating, or showing accountability about adaptation and peacebuilding. This communication step will require dedicated budgets for communication strategies and products designed to reach varied audiences (UNDP, 2016).

## HOW IS IT DONE?

- Identifying ways to communicate adaptations and peace and conflict impacts to stakeholder groups, recognizing that the most effective language and channels for these communications may differ depending on the audience. The language of humanitarian and peacebuilding organizations, for example, will differ from those of fishers and farmers, so tailor messaging accordingly.
- Being specific in your choice of communication channels. Messaging for conflict-affected communities may be more effectively delivered and trusted by radio in local languages, for example, rather than online or in print.
- Managing expectations among communities, speaking to what realistically can and has been achieved in terms of strengthening climate resilience and peacebuilding in the short, medium, and long term. Delivering on well-communicated, realistic goals, rather than missing aspirational ones, will help build stakeholder confidence in the state and in the NAP process.
- Working with local and district authorities and CSOs to reach the communities that a program was designed to serve; to provide information; to garner feedback about the positive, negative, and unintended impacts that communities have experienced from NAP-related interventions; and to circulate updated information about the NAP process.
- Developing, where appropriate, mechanisms to elicit stakeholder feedback on the NAP process and its alignment with peacebuilding, including community scorecards, citizen report cards, complaints and grievance mechanisms, storytelling, and perception surveys (adelphi, UNEP, & EU, n.d.; U.K. Government Stabilization Unit, 2016; Tänzler et al., 2022).
- Presenting—in both your language and imagery—local populations, beneficiaries, and vulnerable groups as empowered, resilient, and dignified in communications strategies and products (UNDP, 2016).

Be mindful of how people and contexts are framed in these communications. It can be tempting to demonstrate need and appeal to funders by leaning into the challenges and losses that communities in fragile states experience. However, when presenting narratives about fragile contexts to international audiences, focus on what works, and have humility by presenting people and communities as resilient and with capacities for improvement, not just needs. Sustainable peace is built on these capacities, and communities become increasingly resilient to climate change and conflict when these capacities are bolstered and utilized in times of stress. We also recommend use of gender-empowering language. In conflict settings, it can be challenging to find media and images that tell a story without exploiting the trauma of vulnerable and suffering people. Be mindful to use dignified images that exemplify the agency and resilience of people recovering from conflict and climate impacts, rather than images depicting individual suffering. Finally, it is of the utmost importance to obtain consent when taking or using images of conflict for the purposes of adaptation communications, in particular images of children (UNDP, 2016).

# 5

## Conclusions

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This guidance note demonstrates how governments emerging from conflict can begin to plan, finance, implement, monitor, evaluate, and learn from adaptation planning throughout the NAP process so that adaptation actions integrate with and respond to peace and conflict dynamics. It is meant to be a starting point for such work; as more conflict-affected states delve further into their planning processes and the transition toward NAP implementation, future lessons will be learned and can build upon this foundation.

While the opportunities for including conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding in the NAP process are expansive, the challenges are real. The international climate change community, including funders like the GCF, have a responsibility to provide a more equitable platform and dedicated funding for conflict-affected countries. Fragile states are at a disadvantage when competing for funding with peaceful and stable LDC nations, where programming is easier and safer to implement (UNDP, 2021). Gaps in climate data and knowledge, and the capacity to understand and analyze them, persist. Scaling up the current, local, resource-centered peacebuilding efforts in NAPs to address more complex elements of tension at the state or national level will require more commitment and resources from international partners and already-stretched government teams.

All of this is, of course, easier said than done. Entrenched interests, whether political, economic, or social, may block or derail efforts to put in place the enabling factors needed to support the NAP process, or to take advantage of the entry points for aligning adaptation actions with peacebuilding. This document has assumed that governments undertaking a NAP process are well-intentioned and wish to lay the foundations for long-term adaptation and peace for all citizens. It assumes integrity and a commitment to public service for the greater good but acknowledges that not every fragile state has the interest and motivation needed to create a conflict-sensitive NAP process.

It is increasingly clear that climate vulnerabilities and conflict risks are, for many nations, closely linked: conflict and violence undermine the ability of a population to deal with the increasingly severe impacts of a changing climate, and at the same time, climate change threatens to exacerbate create tensions and conflicts. Thankfully, the opposite is also true: well-designed and well-implemented adaptation actions can help address the shared drivers of both climate vulnerability and conflict, while effective peacebuilding actions serve to strengthen a population's ability to cope with and recover from the impacts of climate change. Aligning the NAP and peacebuilding processes in post-conflict countries can help strengthen the foundations upon which peaceful, climate-resilient communities are built.

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# Appendix 1. Discussions of Peace and Conflict in NAP Documents Published to the UNFCCC Website as of November 30, 2023

Table A1. Integration of peace and conflict into NAPs submitted to the UNFCCC

	Country	NAP submitted (year)	Fragile States Index, 2022 (of 179 countries)	Integration of conflict or peace
1	Albania	2021	121	Does not discuss
2	Argentina	2023	139	Conflict as a driver of vulnerability; conflict resulting from climate impacts; adaptation as conflict prevention or peacebuilding
3	Armenia	2021	97	NAP aligns with national peace or security plans
4	Bangladesh	2023	41	Adaptation as conflict prevention or peacebuilding
5	Benin	2022	76	Conflict resulting from climate impacts
6	Bhutan	2023	96	Does not discuss
7	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2022	77	Conflict resulting from climate impacts
8	Brazil	2016	71	Intensifying conflict over resources; proposes adaptation as conflict prevention/peacebuilding
9	Burkina Faso	2015	29	Intensifying conflict over resources; proposes adaptation as conflict prevention/peacebuilding
10	Cabo Verde	2022	114	Does not discuss



	Country	NAP submitted (year)	Fragile States Index, 2022 (of 179 countries)	Integration of conflict or peace
11	Cambodia	2021	50	Does not discuss
12	Cameroon	2015	17	Conflict as a driver of vulnerability; intensifying conflict over resources
13	Central African Republic	2022	5	Conflict as a driver of vulnerability; intensifying conflict over resources; NAP aligns with national peace or security plans; adaptation proposed as conflict prevention/peacebuilding
14	Chad	2022	9	Conflict as a driver of vulnerability; intensifying conflict over resources
15	Chile	2017	144	Intensifying conflict over resources
16	Colombia	2018	60	Intensifying conflict over resources
17	Costa Rica	2022	149	Intensifying conflict over resources
18	Democratic Republic of the Congo	2022	6	Conflict as a driver of vulnerability; intensifying conflict over resources; adaptation proposed as conflict prevention/peacebuilding
19	Ecuador	2023	87	Conflict resulting from climate impacts; adaptation as conflict prevention or peacebuilding
20	Ethiopia	2019	11	Intensifying conflict over resources; adaptation proposed as conflict prevention/peacebuilding
21	Fiji	2018	90	Does not discuss
22	Grenada	2019	126	Does not discuss
23	Guatemala	2019	64	Intensifying conflict over resources
24	Haiti	2023	10	Does not discuss

	Country	NAP submitted (year)	Fragile States Index, 2022 (of 179 countries)	Integration of conflict or peace
25	Kenya	2017	33	Intensifying conflict over resources; adaptation proposed as conflict prevention/peacebuilding
26	Kiribati	2020	NA	Intensifying conflict over resources
27	Kuwait	2021	130	Does not discuss
28	Liberia	2021	33	Conflict as a driver of vulnerability
29	Madagascar	2022	52	Intensifying conflict over resources; adaptation proposed as conflict prevention/peacebuilding
30	Mozambique	2023	21	Does not discuss
31	Nepal	2021	49	Conflict resulting from climate impacts
32	Niger	2022	20	Conflict as a driver of vulnerability; intensifying conflict over resources; adaptation proposed as conflict prevention/peacebuilding
33	Pakistan	2023	31	Conflict resulting from climate impacts
34	Papua New Guinea	2023	59	Conflict resulting from climate responses – mitigation and adaptation
35	Paraguay	2022	103	Intensifying conflict over resources
36	Peru	2021	87	Conflict as a driver of vulnerability; intensifying conflict over resources; adaptation proposed as conflict prevention/peacebuilding
37	Saint Lucia	2018	NA	Intensifying conflict over resources; adaptation proposed as conflict prevention/peacebuilding
38	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	2019	NA	Does not discuss

	Country	NAP submitted (year)	Fragile States Index, 2022 (of 179 countries)	Integration of conflict or peace
39	Sierra Leone	2022	46	Conflict as a driver of vulnerability
40	South Africa	2021	79	Does not discuss
41	South Sudan	2021	3	Intensifying conflict over resources; adaptation proposed as conflict prevention/peacebuilding; NAP aligns with national peace or security plans
42	Sri Lanka	2016	56	Does not discuss
43	State of Palestine	2016	37	Conflict as a driver of vulnerability
44	Sudan	2016	7	Conflict as a driver of vulnerability; intensifying conflict over resources
45	Suriname	2020	116	Does not discuss
46	Timor-Leste	2021	56	Conflict as a driver of vulnerability; adaptation proposed as conflict prevention/peacebuilding
47	Togo	2018	42	Intensifying conflict over resources; adaptation proposed as conflict prevention/peacebuilding
48	Tonga	2021	NA	Does not discuss
49	Uruguay	2019	157	Does not discuss
50	Zambia	2023	48	Does not discuss

Sources: The Fund for Peace (2023); UNFCCC (2023); various NAPs.

## Appendix 2. Glossary of Terms

<b>Adaptation</b>	According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the process in human systems of adjusting to actual or expected changes in climate and its effects, to moderate harm and exploit beneficial opportunities (Matthews et al., 2021).
<b>Adaptive capacity</b>	The ability of people, institutions, organizations, and systems, using available skills, values, beliefs, resources, and opportunities, to address, manage, and overcome adverse conditions in the short to medium term (IPCC, 2021).
<b>Conflict</b>	When at least two people or groups clash over competing values or claims to resources, power, or status. It can, but does not always, result in physical violence. Institutions and norms maintain space for non-violent political, social, and economic conflict. However, when governance structures are weak, justice is inaccessible, or socio-political dynamics are divisive, there is the potential for violence or for actors to mobilize groups around a particular identity (United Nations Sustainable Development Group, 2022).
<b>Conflict-affected state</b>	A state “in which significant social and economic disruptions—conflict or post-conflict, national or subnational—lead to weak governance, extensive damage to infrastructure, and disruption of service provision” (Asian Development Bank, 2012).
<b>Conflict sensitivity</b>	The design and implementation of activities that specifically minimize the likelihood of causing harm, exacerbating tensions, or increasing violence within a given context. It is grounded in an awareness and understanding of the peace and conflict context in which activities are being implemented and how activities and the context may influence each other and involves adapting activities accordingly. Conflict sensitivity lays the foundation for sustained peace by maximizing the positive impact of activities (United Nations Sustainable Development Group, 2022). Note that different actors may have different definitions depending on the work they do and the contexts in which they operate.

<b>Fragile state</b>	A state that “has weak capacity to carry out basic functions of governing a population and its territory and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations with society” (OECD, 2011). In these contexts, trust and mutual obligations between the state and its citizens have become weak (OECD, 2011). Conflict can be a cause, symptom, or consequence of state fragility (Asian Development Bank, 2012).
<b>Fragility</b>	The “combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacities of the state, system, and/or communities to manage, absorb, or mitigate those risks” (OECD, 2022).
<b>Gender-responsive approach</b>	An approach to programming that goes beyond sensitivity by explicitly aiming to advance gender equality. Gender-responsive approaches reflect an understanding of gender norms, roles, and inequalities; actively address gender differences in needs, impacts, and access to resources and opportunities; and advance the rights of women and girls toward equal participation and fair and equitable distribution of benefits (adapted from Dazé & Church, 2019; UNDP, 2015).
<b>Peace</b>	In this guidance, peace means a positive peace—not simply the absence of conflict, but the presence of conditions amenable for all people to live full and dignified lives (Galtung, 1969, as cited in European Commission Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, 2021).
<b>Peacebuilding</b>	Activities that aim to reduce the risk of a state, region, or community lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities for peace and conflict management at all levels, establishing a basis for sustainable development (UN Peacekeeping, n.d.). It is a multidisciplinary and long-term process that seeks to enhance the capacity of the state to carry out its core functions effectively and legitimately.
<b>Social inclusion</b>	“An active, intentional, and continuous process to address inequities in power and privilege” (University of British Columbia, n.d.) and to improve the terms of participation in society for people who are disadvantaged (UN, 2016, p. 20).



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